Provincial Insurance Co Ltd

- vs -

Yeo

Judgment

Hashim Yeop A Sani FJ

(delivering the Judgment of the Court)

1. This was a special case stated by the Arbitrator for the decision of the High Court judge under s 22 of the Arbitration Act 1950 (revised 1972).

2. The facts are not in dispute. The claimant was the administratrix of the estate of the deceased who had died in a road accident while riding a motor-cycle. At the time of the accident there was in operation a Talisman policy No T2701802/5 in favour of the deceased. A compensation amounting to a sum of $50,000 would be due to be paid under the policy if the death was within the meaning of the policy.

3. The policy excluded death or disablement caused under circumstances described in seven exception clauses stated in the policy. The relevant exception in this case is Exception 6 which reads as follows:—

   Death or disablement caused by or consequent upon participation in hunting, mountaineering, winter sports, racing of any kind, polo, football, motor-cycling or any form of diving in the sea.

4. The question raised by the Arbitrator for the decision of the court was whether upon a true construction of the policy the word “motor-cycling” in Exception 6 of the policy relates to the use of motor-cycle for any purpose or only to motor-cyling undertaken as part of some sporting activity. 

5. Before the High Court judge and before this court counsel for the insurance company, Mr. Dulip Singh, advocated for the principle of interpretation that where the meaning of the words in the policy is reasonably clear it must be given full effect even though it operates harshly against the assured, relying on MacGillvray on Insurance Law 5th Ed pg 704. He also advocated that Exception 6 should be divided into two limbs for the purpose of construction which approach was however rejected by the trial judge.

6. Counsel for the claimant, Mr. Wilfred Abraham, on the other hand advocated for the adoption of the maxim noscitur a sociis for the true meaning of the word “motor-cycling”. Thus according to counsel the meaning of the word “motor-cycling” has therefore to be ascertained by reference to the meaning of the words associated with it in the said Exception 6.

7. The Arbitrator on the other hand found that the genus to be derived from the activities described in Exception 6 is that they are “physical activities to which an unusual degree of risk of injury attaches.”

8. In a claim of this nature it is for the claimant to show that the injury has caused the death in the manner provided by the policy. See Leong Luen Kiew v The New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd  [1939] MLJ 173 . A policy of insurance is basically subject to the same rules of construction as any other written contract. The words used in it must be given their plain, ordinary meaning but in the context of the policy looked at as a whole and subject to any special definitions contained in the policy — Jason v British Traders’ Insurance Co Ltd [1969] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 281, 190.

9. Although the grammatical sense is not the sole or primary method of construing a policy it does in this case give a useful guide as to the intention of the parties. We agree with the learned judge that the word “participation” is important in reading Exception 6. “Death or disablement caused by or consequent upon participation in football” is easily understood but not “death or disablement caused by football”. Applying the maxim noscitur a sociisto Exception 6 “motor-cycling” referred to in the Exception must therefore be motor-cycling not undertaken in the ordinary sense but motor-cycling in some form of sports or exhibition or competition.

10. We accordingly dismissed the appeal with costs.

Cases

Leong Luen Kiew v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd [1939] MLJ 173; Jason V British Traders’ Insurance Co Ltd [1969] 1 Lloyd Rep 281

Authors and other references

MacGillvray on Insurance Law 5th Ed

Representation

Wilfred Abraham for the appellant.

Dulip Singh for the respondent.