The Straits Times Press (1975) Ltd

- vs -

The Workers' Party

Judgment

LP Thean J

1. The plaintiffs are proprietors and publishers of the English language daily newspaper known as The Straits Times. The first defendant is a political party registered under the Societies Act (Cap 262, 1970 Ed) and the second defendant was at all material times, and still is, the secretary general of the first defendant.

2. On 16 January 1982 The Straits Times carried a report of a speech made by Mr. S Rajaratnam, then Second Deputy Prime Minister, on the previous event at a dinner at the Great Eastern Hotel organised by the district committee of the People’s Action Party. The report said, among other things: ‘Mr Rajaratnam said one WP candidate in the last general election was later discovered to be a bicycle thief.’ The report was written jointly by Edmund Wee (PW1), a journalist of the plaintiffs, who was present at the dinner when Mr. Rajaratnam made the speech and who took down a note of the speech, and Ahmad Osman (PW2), another journalist of the plaintiffs.

3. The defendants were incensed at this report and immediately called a press conference on 18 January 1982 at 3 pm, at which were present two representatives of the plaintiffs, namely, Leslie Fong (PW3), the associate editor of the plaintiffs and PW2. The second defendant then issued a challenge to Mr. Rajaratnam either to name the alleged bicycle thief, in which case he said that Mr. Rajaratnam would be sued by such candidate, or, if Mr. Rajaratnam did not name such a candidate, then the first defendant would sue him, in either case for defamation. The second defendant further said that the challenge would serve as a notice to Mr. Rajaratnam and that Mr. Rajaratnam might reconsider the statement as reported and issue an apology. The second defendant also threatened to take legal action for defamation against the plaintiffs if they failed to publish an apology in the form and on the terms then demanded.

4. Upon returning to the plaintiffs’ office at Times House, PW3 at once called a meeting at which he himself, PW1, PW2 and one Bob Ng, the executive editor of the plaintiffs, were present. The purpose of the meeting was of course to determine whether the plaintiffs had made an error in the report of Mr. Rajaratnam’s speech. In the course of checking with PW1 as to what Mr. Rajaratnam spoke, PW3 called for the library file and from there he found that the bicycle thief referred to by Mr. Rajaratnam was obviously Wu Ker, who stood as a candidate in a previous general election and not the last one as reported by PW1. Enquiries were then made by PW3 with reporters of the Chinese press and Singapore Broadcasting Corp and also with Mr. Rajaratnam himself, after which all four of them unanimously came to the conclusion that an error in the reporting had been made and decided that the plaintiffs ought to publish a correction and an apology. Accordingly on the following day, 19 January 1982 the plaintiffs caused a correction and an apology to be published in The Straits Times which is as follows:

   Candidate stood in 1972 election Last Saturday, The Straits Times reported Mr. Rajaratnam as having said, in off-the-cuff remarks during a dinner speech on Friday, that one Workers’ Party candidate in the last general election was later discovered to be a bicycle thief. This is incorrect. The Second Deputy Prime Minister (Foreign Affairs) did not say that the man stood in the 1980 general election. He told The Straits Times last night that he was referring to a WP candidate who stood in 1972. We apologise to all eight WP candidates who stood in the 1980 general election and to the party for the imputation contained in the report. We also apologise to Mr. Rajaratnam for the inaccurate report.

5. On the same day, the first defendant issued a press release signed by the second defendant (the press release) which is as follows:

   PRESS RELEASE The Workers’ Party notes that the Second Deputy Prime Minister Mr. S Rajaratnam has failed to respond to the challenge by the Party and has sought refuge behind The Straits Times who has attempted to go to his rescue by a statement that he was reported incorrectly. The Party is now proceeding to commence proceedings against both Mr. S Rajaratnam and The Straits Times for defamation. Sgd: JB Jeyaretnam (Secretary-General)

6. The plaintiffs took exception to this press release and on 22 January 1982 their solicitors wrote to the first defendant and also to the second defendant complaining that the statement contained in the press release was defamatory of the plaintiffs and demanded an apology. The defendants through their solicitors in reply denied that the press release was defamatory of the plaintiffs. In consequence, the plaintiffs, on 23 February 1982, took out a writ against the defendants claiming damages for libel contained in the press release. In their statement of claim the plaintiffs attributed two meanings to the words complained of and I quote below the two meanings as alleged in para 7 thereof:

   In their natural and ordinary meaning, the said words meant and were understood to mean that the plaintiffs had attempted, by publishing in the issue of The Straits Times dated 19 January 1982 an item in the form hereunder particularized, with the intent and for the purpose of rescuing or protecting Mr. Rajaratnam from and in respect of the said challenge. In their natural and ordinary meaning, the said words also meant that the plaintiffs, in their said business, had knowingly published an item in The Straits Times which was untrue.

7. In their defence the defendants denied that the words bore the meanings as alleged or any meaning defamatory of the plaintiffs and further, in the alternative, averted that the words were fair comment upon a matter of public interest, namely, whether Mr. Rajaratnam did say the words attributed to him in the plaintiffs’ publication of 16 January 1982. There are therefore two issues before me:

   1. Whether the words complained of in their natural and ordinary meaning have the meanings attributed to them by the plaintiffs and are defamatory of the plaintiffs, and

   2. Whether the words complained of are fair comment on a matter of public interest.

8. The plaintiffs are relying on the natural and ordinary meaning of the words and not on any particular innuendo therein. The natural and ordinary meaning is that which would be reasonably understood by ordinary persons using their general knowledge and common sense, and this includes any inference which can be reasonably drawn from the words: see the judgment of Lord Reid in Rubber Improvement v Daily Telegraph (1964) AC 234 and the judgment of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952.

9. The press release has two paragraphs and obviously it is the first paragraph which is the subject matter of the complaint. That paragraph consists of only one sentence and the initial part of the sentence ending with the words The Straits Times cannot, in my view, be said to be defamatory in any way of the plaintiffs. The complaint is centred on the ensuing words: ‘who [The Straits Times] has attempted to go to his [Mr. Rajaratnam’s] rescue by a statement that he was reported incorrectly.’ However, these words must be read in the context of the press release. It is the contention of the plaintiffs that read in that context the words convey the meaning that the plaintiffs published the correction and apology with the intent and for the purpose of rescuing and protecting Mr. Rajaratnam from the challenge made by the defendants and impute that the plaintiffs had corruptly, dishonestly and deliberately published a false correction. This contention I am unable to accept. To construe the words as having such a meaning and containing such an imputation would in effect be straining the language and drawing unsustainable inference therefrom. One must really read the press release as a whole and read as a whole the meaning seems to me to be clear: it was an attack on Mr. Rajaratnam and any adverse imputation therein was directed towards Mr. Rajaratnam, and not the plaintiffs.

10. The press release must also be viewed in the light of the circumstances in which it was published. Prior to its publication the plaintiffs had reported incorrectly part of the speech of Mr. Rajaratnam, and they subsequently published a correction and an apology. An ordinary person using his general knowledge and common sense on reading the press release would not have understood it to mean that the plaintiffs had corruptly, dishonestly and deliberately published the correction and apology to shield Mr. Rajaratnam. Taking a reasonable view of the situation, it is highly unlikely that such a person would come to this conclusion. As Lord Selborne LC said in Capital & Counties Bank v George Henty & Sons (1882) 7 App Cas 741:

    The test, according to the authorities, is, whether under the circumstances in which the writing was published, reasonable men, to whom the publication was made, would be likely to understand it in a libellous sense.

11. It may be that some persons might have understood the words complained of as conveying an imputation of dishonest, corrupt or false publication by the plaintiffs in their newspaper, but that is not enough: see the judgment of Lord Halsbury LC in Nevill v Fine Art & General Insurance Co [1897] AC 68 73.

12. The plaintiffs seem to suggest that the sting is in the words that the plaintiffs had attempted to go to Mr. Rajaratnam’s rescue and the inference from these words. It seems to me that reading the press release as a whole and considering it in the circumstances in which it was published an ordinary person would not reasonably infer from these words the grave and serious imputation contended by the plaintiffs; such a person would in all probability have regarded that the defendants had used these words extravagantly, as people do occasionally. In this connection, I find extremely apposite the following passage of the judgment of Lord Watson LC in Australian Newspaper Co v Bennett [1894] AC 284, at pp 287-288:

    The judgment of the court below was founded on the use of the word ‘Ananias’. Windeyer J has expressed the opinion that only one meaning could be attributed to that word, that everyone must understand it to impute wilful and deliberate falsehood, and that therefore the mere use of the word ‘Ananias’, which necessarily involves such an imputation, could not reasonably be held to be innocent, or to be otherwise than intended to cast this imputation upon the plaintiff. Even admitting that the natural effect of the use of the word ‘Ananias’ standing alone would be to convey the imputation suggested, the learned judge appears to their Lordships, with all respect, to have lost sight of the fact that people not unfrequently use words, and are understood to use words, not in their natural sense, or as conveying the imputation which, in ordinary circumstances, and apart from their surroundings, they would convey, but extravagantly, and in a manner which would be understood by those who hear or read them as not conveying the grave imputation suggested by a mere consideration of the words themselves.

13. In my opinion, the words complained of in their natural and ordinary meaning are not defamatory of the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs’ claim therefore fails.

14. The defendants raised a further defence, namely: the words complained of are fair comment made without malice on a matter of public interest. This defence has no merit at all. I reiterate what I said in Jeyaratnam JB v Goh Chok Tong [1984-1985] SLR 516: to sustain such a defence the defendants must establish four requisite elements:

    1. the words complained of are comment though the comment may consist of or include inference of facts;

    2. the comment is on a matter of public interest;

    3. the comment is based on facts, and

    4. the comment is one which a fair-minded person can honestly make on the facts proved.

       See para 12.02 of Duncan & Neil On Defamation (2nd Ed).

    So far as this defence is concerned, it fails to satisfy these requirements; the words complained of are clearly not comment but a statement of fact; nor are they comment based on any fact at all. Therefore this defence fails.

15. I dismiss the action. On the question of costs, there are two matters which merit consideration and I have considered them.

    • First, the defendants raised the defence of fair comment which has failed. Such a defence, in my view, should not have been raised at all; there is no basis for it.

    • Secondly, counsel for the first defendant, who is himself the second defendant, went at great length in cross-examining all the witnesses called by the plaintiffs on extraneous matters which have no bearing on the issue at all, thus prolonging the trial unnecessarily.

    The defendants therefore must bear part of the costs for such ill-advised moves. I accordingly order the plaintiffs to pay to the defendants only two-thirds of the costs of this action. Both the defendants are represented by the same firm of solicitors, though at the hearing they were represented by separate counsel; but counsel for the first defendant is the second defendant himself, and in effect assumed the role of leading counsel in the defence. In the circumstances, I allow only one set of costs to the defendants.

Cases

Australian Newspaper Co v Bennett [1984] AC 284; Capital & Counties Bank v George Henty & Sons (1882) 7 App Cas 741; Jeyaretnam JB v Goh Chok Tong [1984-1985] SLR 516; Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952; Nevill v Fine Art And General Insurance Co [1897] AC 68; Rubber Improvement v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234

Authors and other references

Duncan & Neil On Defamation (2nd Ed)

Representations

AP Godwin and Dora YS Cheok (Godwin & Co) for the plaintiffs.

JB Jeyaretnam (JB Jeyaretnam & Co) for the first defendant.

Subhas Anandan (MPD Nair & Co) for the second defendant.