FEDERAL COURT OF MALAYSIA
|
www.ipsofactoJ.com/appeal/index.htm [2000] Part 4 Case 9 [FCM] |
|
|
FEDERAL COURT OF MALAYSIA |
|
Coram |
Malaysia Air Charter Co Sdn Bhd -
vs - Petronas Dagangan Sdn Bhd |
|
|
WAN
ADNAN CJ (MALAYA) MOHAMED
DZAIDDIN FCJ ABDUL MALEK AHMAD FCJ |
23
SEPTEMBER 2000 |
Judgment
Mohamed Dzaiddin FCJ
(delivering the judgment of the court)
This appeal is concerned with the interpretation of s. 218(2)(a) of the Companies Act 1965 (the Act) which reads as follows:
|
(2) |
A company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts if- |
|
|
(a) |
a creditor by assignment or otherwise to whom the company is indebted in a sum exceeding five hundred ringgit then due has served on the company by leaving at the registered office a demand under his hand or under the hand of his agent thereunto lawfully authorized requiring the company to pay the sum so due, and the company has for three weeks thereafter neglected to pay the sum or to secure or compound for it to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor; |
|
Leave
to appeal was granted by this court to the appellant on March 20, 2000 for
the determination of the following questions of law:
Whether
s. 218(2)(a) of the Companies Act 1965 is to be interpreted literally
and strictly or widely and liberally.
In
the event it is the literal and strict interpretation that ought to be
adopted, whether the s. 218 notice must quantify and specify the exact
and actual sum due as at the date of the demand and leave no further
sums / amounts to be calculated / quantified or ascertained by the
recipient of the notice.
BACKGROUND
The brief facts of the case are these. On October 18, 1989, the respondent obtained a judgment-in-default of appearance against the appellant in the Kuala Lumpur High Court for a sum of RM334,118.79 together with interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum from October 28, 1988 until date of payment. The appellant made no effort to have the said default judgment set aside. Then on October 16, 1991, the respondent's solicitors served on the appellant a statutory notice of demand pursuant to s 218 of the Act which reads as follows:
TAKE
NOTICE that you are now required to pay to us as Solicitors for
Petronas Dagangan Sdn Bhd or secure or compound to the satisfaction
of Petronas Dagangan Sdn Bhd the judgment sum of $334,118.79
together with interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum on all
outstanding sums from the 28th day of October 1988 until the date of
realisation and the sum of $225.00 costs being judgment obtained
against you at the Kuala Lumpur High Court KOD No. D2-23-2714-88
within three (3) weeks from the date of receipt of this Notice,
failing which you shall be deemed to be unable to pay your debts and
appropriate action will be taken for the Winding-Up of Malaysia Air
Charter Co. Sdn. Bhd. Sgd. Solicitors for Petronas Dagangan Sdn Bhd [emphasis provided] |
On
February 27, 1992, the respondent presented a petition for winding-up of the
appellant on the ground that the sum demanded in the notice had not been
paid by the appellant. It was at this stage that the appellant disputed the
validity of the s 218 notice. On May 6, 1996 the High Court ordered that the
appellant be wound up. However, by consent, the winding-up order was stayed
pending an appeal to the Court of Appeal.
In the Court of Appeal, the argument on behalf of the appellant on the validity of the respondent's s.218 notice was two-fold.
First, it was submitted that the demand under s 218(2)(a) required "the sum so due" to be clearly specified and quantified and that no sum whatsoever ought to be left to be calculated or ascertained by the recipient of the notice. Failure to do so would result in the statutory notice being invalid.
Secondly,
the sum demanded by the respondent, namely, "the judgment sum of
RM334,118.79 together with interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum
on all outstanding sums from October 28, 1988 until the date of
realisation" was in excess of what was actually due, and
therefore the notice was invalid and did not raise the presumption under
the said section.
The
Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, held that the failure to quantify
the actual sum due in the s 218 notice did not render the demand invalid,
and on the facts, the sum demanded in the respondent's notice was not
excessive. See the judgment reported in [2000] 1 AMR 757.
The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Sri Hartamas Development Sdn Bhd v MBf Finance Bhd [1992] 1 MLJ 313 where the statutory notice of demand under s 218 is similar to the present case. It also followed its own decision in UMBC Bhd v Richland Trade & Development Sdn Bhd (unreported) which was affirmed by the Federal Court. (See [2000] 1 AMR 105).
In following Sri Hartamas, the Court of Appeal, per Shaik Daud, JC stated (at p 763):
|
The Supreme Court while endorsing that s 218(2)(a) ought to be strictly interpreted went on to say that a demand does not fall within s. 218(2) if the amount demanded exceeds the sum actually due, and held that in that case the statutory demand was not bad or invalid, as it was made in writing and was signed and delivered at the registered address of the appellants and it had specified the actual amount due. We believe what the Supreme Court was saying is that the amount due is the judgment sum including interest. Although the statutory notice in Sri Hartamas did not quantify the interest due, nevertheless the Supreme Court held that it was a good and valid notice. In the final analysis the purpose of the statutory notice is to demand the judgment sum inclusive of the interest, quantified or otherwise, and if not paid within the stipulated period of three weeks, is to warn the debtor of an impending petition. Had the notice mentioned a sum in excess of the judgment sum then such notice would not have strictly complied with s.218(2)(a) and thus would be bad and invalid. We are bound by the decision in Sri Hartamas. Since the notice in the present appeal is similar with that in Sri Hartamas, we hold that the notice, although it did not quantify the interest due, was made in writing and was signed and delivered by the respondent's authorised agent at the appellant's registered address and it has specified the actual sum due which was not disputed, was a good and valid notice. Section 218(2)(a) only provides that a demand under the hand of the creditor or under the hand of his agent lawfully authorised, must be served on the company by leaving the said document at its registered address requiring the company to pay the sum due. It is our view that it makes no difference whether the interest is quantified or not. |
His Lordship concluded (at p 764):
|
In the present appeal we hold that the requirements of the section relating to demand has been similarly complied with. Therefore we see no merits in the argument that since the interest is not quantified the notice is bad and invalid. We would like to reiterate that even by the non-quantification of the interest in the notice, the respondents had strictly complied with the requirements of s 218(2)(a). We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs and order the deposit to go to the account of taxed costs. |
APPEAL
TO THIS COURT
Before
us, the thrust of Mr. Saranjit's submission is that s 218(2)(a) of the Act
should be construed literally and the statutory notice of demand requiring
the company to pay the sum due must contain a specific, ascertained and
quantified sum as at the date of the notice.
Counsel
submitted that the Court of Appeal was correct in its decision that s 218 of
the Act must be construed strictly. The court followed Re Perusahaan
Jenwatt Sdn Bhd [1990] 2 MLJ 178 which was approved and followed by the
Supreme Court in Sri Hartamas.
In Re Perusahaan Jenwatt the Government of Malaysia obtained a judgment-in-default of appearance against a company for the sum of $25,987.50 with interest thereon calculated at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of judgment to the date of realization and costs of $225. The government then sent a notice of demand to the company for payment of the sum of $295,584.46 pursuant to s.218(2)(a) of the Act.
Subsequently, the government presented to the court a petition for the winding-up of the company on the ground that the company was unable to pay its debts. In the petition, the government stated that the company was indebted to the government in the sum of $29,584.46 and that the company had not complied with the notice of demand.
The
company applied to the court for an order setting aside the petition on the
ground that the notice was invalid as the company did not owe the government
the amount stated in the notice.
In
allowing the company's application, Zakaria Yatim J (as he then was) held
that s.218(2)(a) of the Act should be given a literal interpretation and the
notice of demand must comply strictly with the requirements of s.218(2)(a).
On the facts, his Lordship found the notice of demand had not complied
strictly with the requirements of s.218(2)(a) because the amount stated in
the said notice was far in excess of the debt due and therefore the notice
was invalid.
In
Sri Hartamas, the primary issue was whether the petition for
winding-up was presented three weeks after the statutory notice under
s.218(2)(a) of the Act. The High Court held the notice was properly issued
and was in strict compliance with the section.
On
appeal, the Supreme Court in affirming the decision of the High Court that
the demand must comply strictly with the requirements of s.218(2)(a) held
that the three weeks in the subsection referred to the neglect to pay before
the presumption of inability to pay the debt arose and was not a requirement
relating to the notice of demand. The court also agreed with Re
Perusahaan Jenwatt that a demand did not fall within s.218(2)(a) of the
Act if the amount demanded exceeded the sum actually due.
Counsel
submitted that on a strict interpretation of s.218, a notice of demand under
subsection (2)(a) of the section must quantify or specify the actual sum so
due as at the date of the notice. As an exercise in statutory
interpretation, words and phrases in a statute must be given their ordinary
meaning [Chin Choy v Collector of Stamp Duties [1979] 1 MLJ 69].
Therefore, the word "sum" in the subsection (2)(a) must bear a
plain dictionary meaning, i.e. "a quantity or amount of money";
"a sum of money"; "quantity of money of a specified
amount". (The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary). Hence, what the
subsection envisaged was a specific or ascertained sum as at the date of the
notice. Secondly, taking the literal construction approach, creditors who
resort to s.218 procedure are not entitled to truncate the right conferred
under subsection (2)(a) which requires strict compliance. Counsel concluded
that a s.218(2)(a) notice which merely demands the terms of the judgment
without specifying the actual sum so due as at the date of the notice is
therefore invalid and cannot form the basis of the winding-up petition under
s.218(1)(a) of the Act.
Counsel
referred to several authorities which we shall now examine.
In
Re Perusahaan Jenwatt, the amount stated in the s 218(2)(a) notice
was found to be in excess of the debt due. The High Court taking the strict
interpretation approach held the notice to be invalid as the sum demanded
exceeded the sum actually due. The learned Judge followed Processed Sand
Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (1982-83) 7 ACLR 956.
In Processed Sand, there was no dispute as to the fact of the indebtedness of each plaintiff to the defendant, but only as to the amount due. The question in issue was as to the validity of a notice of demand which required payment of a sum which was greater than the amount actually due. On the true construction of s.364(2)(a) [in pari materia with our s.218(2)(a)] of the New South Wales Companies Code, Waddell J adopted the literal interpretation and held that a notice of demand which claimed more than the amount actually due did not come within the section and non-compliance with it did not give rise to any deemed inability on the part of the company to pay its debt. He reasoned as follows (p 961):
|
Its effect is to provide a statutory admission that a company is unable to pay its debts. One would expect such an admission to be created only if the amount claimed by the notice of demand and not paid or secured or compounded for to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor was an amount either admittedly due or one as to which there was no real dispute as to liability. It would seem arbitrary and unjust to create an admission arising on failure to pay etc. a debt, a part of which was not due. |
The above decision was followed in Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Cye International Pty Ltd (1986) 4 ACLC 281.
In
Re Pardoo Nominees Pty Ltd (1987) 11 ACLR 573, the Supreme Court of
Tasmania case, the plaintiff served a demand on the defendant company for
$176,431.40 pursuant to s. 364(2) of the Companies (Tas) Code. The defendant
failed to comply with the demand. The actual amount owing at the date of the
demand was only $172,434.81. The question before the court was whether the
plaintiff had established the requirements for deemed insolvency under
s.364(2). The use of the word "deemed" in s.364(2) does not
constitute a statutory fiction but rather lists methods of proof and
accordingly, one may interpret the section in a practical frame of mind.
Secondly, in making an order for winding-up of the company, Cosgrove J held
that the primary fact of a debt in excess of $1,000 and failure to pay had
been established, the fact that a demand claims a sum, part of which was
disputed or irrecoverable, was irrelevant. His Lordship refused to follow
Waddell J's reasoning in Processed Sand because "the decision is
based quite specifically on a literal interpretation of paragraph (a) of
sub-section (2) of s.364."
In Re Fabo Pty Ltd (1988) 14 ACLR 518, the statutory demand was for A$131,469.82 comprising a judgment debt and interest and two other sums due and costs of A$ 19.60 which was not due. The company did not dispute the indebtedness in the amounts claimed. At the hearing before the Master, no order was made regarding costs. The notice therefore overstated the sum due under s.364(2)(a) Companies (Victoria) Code. The Master referred to a judge, who in turn referred to the full court, the question whether in these circumstances a winding-up order should be made. The full court, ordering that the company should be wound up, held, inter alia, that overstatement in the notice of demand of the amount due did not destroy the validity of the notice. The fact of non-compliance with the demand may still be relied upon to prove insolvency. Crocket ACJ, O'Bryan and Vincent JJ approved Re Pardoo. The learned Judges were fully appraised of the conflicting approaches taken by Cosgrove J in Re Pardoo and Waddell J in Processed Sand. In preferring the liberal interpretation to s.364(2)(a), their Lordships were of the view that there are a number of considerations that render the adoption of a literal interpretation difficult, which inter alia, include the following (at pp 521 - 522):
In this context care must be taken to distinguish between cases where a genuine dispute as to the fact of indebtedness in respect of an amount satisfying the statutory requirement may exist and those in which, whatever may be the situation in respect of some part of the sum claimed, there is clearly an outstanding debt to such an amount. With respect we do not share the view expressed by Wadell J that in the latter situation it would be arbitrary or unjust to give effect to the "deeming" provision of s.364(2). |
Their Lordships concluded (at p 523):
|
In
consequence the construction that we prefer is that the subsection
does not operate so as to create a "statutory fiction".
The opinion that it does have such an effect appears to us to afford
by implication, if not expressly, the foundation for the conclusion
that an overstatement of amount of the debt destroys the validity of
the notice in the cases in which it was so held. With respect, for
the reasons given, we consider the contrary view to be the better
view. What the subsection does is to provide certain avenues of
proof of insolvency by allowing the conclusion of insolvency to be
drawn wherever the circumstances are appropriate. In our opinion, having been called upon to pay an amount including a sum undoubtedly due, the company could be reasonably called upon to pay that sum and to demonstrate the existence of genuine dispute as to its liability in respect of the balance. |
In
Ataxtin Pty Ltd v Gordon Pacific Developments Pty Ltd (1991) 9 ACLC
865, the applicant had obtained a judgment for the sum of $475,000 plus
interest from the Supreme Court of Victoria against the respondent. The
respondent appealed to the full court in Victoria, which refused to stay the
execution of the judgment. The applicant issued a warrant to execute the
judgment. Subsequently it received $286.78 from the Sheriffs Office of
Victoria in relation to that warrant.
The
applicant then issued a demand under s.460(2)(a) of the Corporations Law for
the judgment debt plus interest accrued. Due to a miscalculation the
demanded sum of $552,484.22 was in excess of the amount then owing by $4.53.
The respondent did not comply with the demand and a winding-up application
was made by the applicant in the Federal Court.
One of the questions raised before Heerey J was whether the s.460(2)(a) demand which overstated the actual sum due was valid. His Lordship held that on its true construction the demand was invalid. A demand, non-compliance with which triggers the statutory deeming of inability to pay debts, has to be one which requires the company to pay the actual sum which is due. He made the decision on the basis that this was an exercise in statutory construction. Citing the words of Gibbs CJ in Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pte Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 81 ATC 4292 that it is an elementary and fundamental principle that the object of the court, in interpreting a statute, "is to see what is the intention expressed by the words used", his Lordship held as follows (p 870):
|
Approaching s.460(2)(a) afresh, it seems to me that its ordinary and natural meaning is that the company has to be "indebted in a sum exceeding $1,000 then due" and that the demand, non-compliance with which triggers the statutory deeming of inability to pay debts, has to be one which requires the company "to pay the sum so due", that is to say, the actual sum which is due. |
His
Lordship appeared to be fully aware of conflicting decisions in Australia
where the courts in Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania, Western Australia
and the Northern Territory have held such a demand to be valid, but the New
South Wales and Queensland courts held otherwise. His Lordship did not
follow Re Fabo, a decision of the full court of Victoria which took a
liberal approach and held a demand was valid if it claimed an amount in
excess of the sum due.
His
Lordship observed that the courts which adopted the liberal approach to the
section did not attempt any construction of the actual language of the
statute which fitted that view. He also disagreed with the proposition that
one should avoid a technical construction of the law which would produce the
absurd result that a company undoubtedly insolvent and admittedly owing a
large amount to a creditor would escape winding-up because of some tiny
miscalculation, something which would be quite likely to happen where there
are complex running accounts, interest calculations and the like.
In
Singapore, in so far as we are aware, there are two cases on the point in
issue. The relevant section is s.254(2)(a) of the Singapore Companies Act
(Cap 50, 1990 Edn). In Re Inter-Builders Development Pte Ltd [1991] 3
MLJ 259, the company opposed the petition for winding-up on the ground that
the amount due as stated in the statutory demand was in error which would
render the demand defective.
Rajendran J followed Re Pardoo and Re Fabo and disagreed with Re Perusahaan Jenwatt. Adopting the liberal interpretation, his Lordship held (p 262):
|
In my view, s.254(2)(a) would operate if the petitioning creditor can establish that a sum exceeding $2,000 is due to him from the company and he has made a demand for a sum in excess of $2,000 in the manner provided in s.254(2)(a) which the debtor has neglected to pay. |
The above decision was followed later in Re Makin Nominees Pte Ltd [1994] 3 SLR 429. This is what T.Q. Lim JC stated:
|
I respectfully agree with Rajendran J in preferring to follow Re Pardoo Nominees Pty Ltd and Re Fabo Pty Ltd. I think a statutory demand requiring payment of an amount that includes a sum exceeding $2,000 that is admittedly due is not invalid for the purpose of s.254(2)(a) of the Companies Act by reason only that the amount also includes a sum not due. It is as well a demand requiring the company to pay the sum due notwithstanding that it is also a demand as to a sum not due. I see no difference in principle between the sum not due and a claim which is met by a set off or counterclaim or cross-claim made bona fide and based on substantial grounds. If the company omits to pay the sum admittedly due and to dispute its liability as to the excess without any explanation for the omission it is open to the court to find that the company has neglected to pay the sum due and that it is unable to pay its debts. This is particularly so where the sum admittedly due can be readily seen on the face of the demand or the accompanying statements as in this case and the company fails to respond altogether. |
From
the Australian authorities which we have examined, it is clear to us that
there exists a conflict of decisions with respect to the interpretation of
the provisions of their equivalent to our s.218(2)(a) of the Act on the
question whether the statutory demand is valid if it claims an amount in
excess of that due by the company. Waddell J in Processed Sand,
supported by Heerey J in Ataxtin adopted the literal interpretation
and held that an excess claim makes the demand invalid. On the other hand. Re
Pardoo, which was approved at the appellate level by the full court of
Victoria in Re Fabo took the liberal approach, whose reasoning was
followed by at least two Singapore High Court decisions.
After analysing the authorities, we would prefer the reasoning and conclusion of the full court of Victoria in Re Fabo that the court should adopt a liberal interpretation when considering the provisions of s.218(2)(a) of the Act. We have earlier set out the reasons of the full court for adopting a liberal interpretation and their considerations that the adoption of a literal interpretation would be difficult.
We would reiterate here that we agree with Re Fabo that a literal interpretation of the section would compel the court not to make a winding-up order notwithstanding the existence of clear evidence that an undisputed sum due exceeding RM500 has remained unpaid after a demand made without any reasonable explanation for the failure to pay.
In
the instant case, the statutory demand required the appellant to pay the
respondent the judgment sum of RM334,118.79 together with interest at 8% per
annum etc. as at the date of the notice. From the evidence, the aforesaid
sum remained unpaid. Thus, if we were to interpret the section literally or
strictly, it means no winding-up order could be made as the exact amount due
as at the date of the notice has not been quantified, notwithstanding that
the debt exceeded RM500 and remained unpaid. By contrast, the liberal
interpretation would permit the court, if proved to its satisfaction, to
make a winding-up order.
Secondly, we agree with Re Fabo that commercial reality demands that
|
preference be given to an interpretation that will remove from unmeritorious respondents the temptation to undertake an investigation into the exactness of the debt claimed to be owing on the relevant date in cases where complicated accounts or running accounts with daily adjustments may render probable the risk of some small errors having been made in the course of ascertaining with precision the extent of the debt. Indeed, the possibility exists that a contrary interpretation might lead to the absurdity that an understatement of the debt in the notice would prevent the making of an order where to do so was clearly appropriate |
It
is necessary to consider the factual situation presented in this appeal for
the unreality of the literal approach to become evident. Here, the appellant
was required to pay the respondent the judgment sum of RM334,118.79 together
with interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum on all outstanding sums
from October 28, 1988 until the date of realisation. By taking the literal
interpretation approach, the respondent is required to undertake an exercise
in calculating the exact sum due as at the date of the notice when on the
face of the notice the sum due is more than RM5 00 and the appellant has
been shown as deemed to be unable to pay its debts.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, our answer to the two questions posed in the appeal is that s.218(2)(a) of the Act should be liberally interpreted. A notice of demand under the subsection need not specify the exact sum due as at the date of the demand. So long the sum due exceeds RM500 and remained unpaid after a demand made without any reasonable explanation to the satisfaction of the court, there is therefore neglect to pay such sum within the meaning of the section.
It
should however be borne in mind that s.218(2)(a) does not create separate
grounds for winding-up, but provides a mode of proof available in aid of an
application seeking a winding-up on the ground specified in s.218(1), viz.
that the company is unable to pay its debts (Ataxtin). A company will
not be wound up, even if it fails to heed a valid notice, if it can
establish by independent evidence that it is solvent (Re Fabo).
In
adopting the Re Fabo approach to the interpretation of s.218(2)(a) of
the Act, we have therefore differed from the High Court decision of Re
Perusahaan Jenwatt which followed Processed Sand. The
Supreme Court in Sri Hartamas likewise adopted a literal
interpretation in dealing with the question whether under s.218(2)(a), a
company was entitled to have three weeks after service of the notice of
demand to either pay, secure or compound the sum demanded. The court also
took the opportunity to agree with Re Perusahaan Jenwatt that a
demand did not fall within s.218(2)(a) if the amount demanded exceeded the
sum actually due. With respect, we consider this passage in the judgment of
C.T.
Gunn
SCJ obiter because the claim of the excess sum in the
notice was never an issue before the court. In fact, the amount stated in
the notice was not in dispute.
Lastly,
returning to the instant case under appeal, it is worth noting that the
Court of Appeal found that the facts therein are on all fours with the facts
in Sri Hartamas. The Court of Appeal followed Sri Hartamas,
on the basis of stare decisis, which in effect held that
although the statutory notice did not quantify the interest due, it was
still a good and valid notice. The Court of Appeal did not make any specific
finding whether s.218(2)(a) is to be interpreted literally as in Re
Perusahaan Jenwatt or liberally, although its conclusion appears to be
based on a liberal interpretation of the subsection.
In
the circumstances, we agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal but
for different reasons. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal with costs and
order the appellant be wound up. Deposit to the respondent to account of
taxed costs.
Cases
Fabo Pty Ltd, Re (1988) 14 ACLR 518; Pardoo Nominees Pty Ltd, Re (1987) 11 ACLR
573; Ataxtin Pty Ltd v Gordon Pacific Developments Pty Ltd (1991) 9 ACLC 865;
Inter-Builders Development Pte Ltd, Re [1991] 3 MLJ 259; Makin Nominees Pte Ltd,
Re [1994] 3 SLR 429; Chin Choy v Collector of Stamp Duties [1979] 1 MLJ 69;
Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pte Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 81 ATC
4292; Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Cye International Pty Ltd (1986)
4 ACLC 281; Malaysia Air Charter Company Sdn Bhd v Petronas Dagangan Sdn Bhd
[2000] 1 AMR 757; Perusahaan Jenwatt Sdn Bhd, Re [1990] 2 MLJ 178; Processed
Sand Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (1982-83) 7 ACLR 956; Sri Hartamas
Development Sdn Bhd v MBf Finance Bhd [1992] 1 MLJ 313; UMBC Bhd v Richland
Trade & Development Sdn Bhd (unreported), CA; UMBC Bhd v Richland Trade
& Development Sdn Bhd [2000] 1 AMR 105.
Legislations
Companies
Act 1965: s. 218
Australia
Companies
Code (NSW): s.364
Companies
Code (Tasmania): s.364
Companies
Code (Victoria): s.364
Corporations
Law: s.460
Singapore
Companies
Act (Cap 50, 1990 Edn): s.254
Authors and other references
The
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
Representations
Saranjit
Singh and Vasdev Bakshani (KS Narayanan Associates) for Appellant
K.W. Moh
and Aznim Azhar (Tengku Mohamed & Alan Lim) for Respondent
Notes:-
This decision is also reported at [2000] 4 AMR 4043
|
|
all rights reserved taiking.thing pte ltd |
|
|
