Judgment

Alauddin Mohd Sheriff FCJ

1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Election Judge which was delivered on 6th September 2004. The appeal was filed by the Appellant (Petitioner in the High Court), Ismail Kamus, who was a duly nominated candidate for PAS to contest the election for the Selangor state constituency of N.17 Gombak Setia in the 11th General Election. The election was held on 21st March 2004. The Respondents to this appeal are the Returning Officer (First Respondent), the Suruhanjaya Pilihanraya (Second Respondent) and the returned candidate (Third Respondent).

2. In the said election, the Third Respondent, as a candidate for Barisan Nasional was declared to be the returned candidate with a majority of 2,728 votes over the Appellant.

3. The Appellant then filed the Election Petition (“EP”) on  27th April 2004 to challenge the legality and the validity of the said election.

4. The relief which the Appellant was seeking in the said EP was for a declaration that the said election for the state constituency of N.17 Gombak Setia which was held on 21st March 2004, was void and that the Third Respondent had not been duly elected or ought not to have been returned pursuant to Section 35(a) and (b) of the Election Offences Act, 1954 (“EOA”).

5. Parties have agreed that the outcome of this appeal i.e. Civil Appeal No: 01-22-2004 (B) which concerns the state seat of Gombak Setia (N.17) will bind Civil Appeal No: 01-23-2004 (B) which concerns the Parliament seat of Gombak (P.98).

6. In support of the EP the Appellant sets out 3 grounds, namely:

   1. The extension of the voting period from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. in contravention of Regulation 11(5) and 23 of the Elections (Conduct of Election) Regulations 1981 (“ECOER”) was illegal and therefore the said election was not conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the election laws and that such non-compliance affected the result of the election.

   2. That the Respondents failed to comply with Regulation 14A of the ECOER which relates to the use of an authoritative text of electoral rolls. In the said election, different electoral rolls were used; and

   3. The abovementioned violations had caused the election not to have been carried out in accordance with the principles laid down in any written law relating to the conduct of any election, and that such non-compliance affected the result of the election (section 32(b) EOA).

7. At the outset of the hearing, the allegations of fact that the time for polling was extended beyond the gazetted time for two hours and that the different electoral rolls were used, were not in dispute. The same position was maintained before us in this appeal.

8. The learned Judge gave his decision on 6th September 2004. In his written judgment, His Lordship ruled that, even though there were clear and blatant non-compliances with the written law relating to the conduct of the election, the Appellant failed to satisfy that such non-compliances affected the result of the election. Therefore, the EP brought by the Appellant was dismissed with costs.

9. On 16th September 2004 the Appellant filed this appeal to this Honourable Court pursuant to section 36A of the EOA, which had been inserted recently vide Election Offences (Amendment) Act 2003.

10. The Memorandum of Appeal sets out 25 grounds of appeal. However, before us learned counsel for the Appellant was content to confine his submission on the following grounds only which he said reflected the 25 grounds.

11. Firstly, learned counsel submitted that the learned Election Judge failed to address his mind to the overriding purpose of laws relating to elections, and chose to adopt a narrow and technical reading of section 32(b). The learned Election Judge therefore failed to give due emphasis to the overriding principles of democracy and the need to protect the purity of the election process. Election laws should be read as rejecting illegal and/or fraudulent practices so that the political and constitutional rights of the citizens of Malaysia can be protected.

12. This Honourable Court as the highest court in the land was respectfully urged to eschew a narrow and highly technical reading of section 32(b), and approve a distinct line of case-law authority in Malaysia (exemplified by the case of Re Tanjung Puteri Johore State Election Petition [1998] 2 MLJ 111) as well as in many parts of the Commonwealth which have adopted the constitutionally correct approach as stated in the English case of Morgan v Simpson [1974] 3 All ER 722.

13. Apart from Tanjung Puteri (supra) the other cases that follow the principle in Morgan v Simpson are Abdul Hamid Mamat v Baharuddin Mohd [1993] 1 AMR 1 and Harris Salleh v The Returning Officer Ismail Majin [2001] 3 MLJ 433. We were urged to consciously apply and enlarge the principles in these cases.

14. Secondly, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted on the issue of burden and standard of proof. It was argued that the burden on the Appellant is a slight one and the existence of the term “appears” in section 32(b) EOA lends force to this submission. The Appellant had discharged that burden of proof. Once the Appellant has succeeded in establishing a breach and effect on the election result, the burden shifts to the Respondents and if the Respondents fail to call witnesses to rebut, an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act can be drawn against the Respondents.

15. Thirdly, learned counsel’s submission focussed on the issue of interpretation of section 32(b) EOA. He argued that whilst it is true that Election Courts have, in general, interpreted the laws concerning election, strictly, the cases on this issue relate more to questions of procedure. In other words, a literal and rigid interpretation is adopted in cases concerning procedural non-compliances. In these cases, the petition is usually struck out at the preliminary stage on the basis of non-compliance with the provisions of the election laws. He cited the following cases i.e. Dr. Lee Chong Meng v Returning Officer (Abdul Rahman Abdullah (No.1) [2003] 3 CLJ 519, Bong Geok Beng v Ahmad Nordin Mohamed Amin [1980] 1 MLJ 167, Chong Thain Vun v Watson [1968] 1 MLJ 65, Norbert Choong Kai Choong v Mohd. Idris Ibrahim [1980] 1 MLJ 316, Patau Rubis v Patrick Uren [1984] 2 CLJ (Rep) 348 and Rhina Bhar v Karpal Singh Ram Singh [1995] 4 CLJ 642.

16. Counsel further contended that since the Respondents in this appeal had conceded that there were breaches of the election laws, an equally rigid and literal mode of interpretation of section 32(b) should not be applied.

17. The last and concluding submission of learned counsel for the Appellant dealt with the broad and detailed issues of evidence that have appeared in this case. It was argued that the learned Judge has failed to apply the correct burden and standard of proof.  Further it was said that, the learned Judge has failed to draw the proper and correct inferences from the evidence tendered by the 24 witnesses for the Appellant. The learned Judge should have accepted the unchallenged evidence of the Appellant as the only relevant evidence before him since the material evidence of breaches of the law was admitted by all Respondents.

18. To put it shortly, both the learned Senior Federal Counsel for the First and Second Respondents and learned counsel for the Third Respondent submitted that the learned Judge was correct in law and fact when His Lordship decided that the Appellant must prove that the non-compliance of the election laws affected the result of the election under section 32(b) EOA.

19. For the purpose of this appeal we propose to deal with the issues raised in two aspects i.e. the Legal issue and the Factual issue. The Legal issue deals with the question whether the Judge had erred in law in his interpretation of section 32(b) EOA 1954 when he held that the onus was on the Appellant to prove to the satisfaction of the Election Judge that

    1. there had been non-compliance with the provisions of the election laws and

    2. that such non-compliance had affected the result of the elections.

    The Factual issue will address the question whether on the facts of the case, the Appellant had proved that there had been non-compliance with Regulations 11(5), 14A, 23 and Form 8 ECOER and that such non-compliance had affected the result of the elections.

20. We shall now begin with the Legal issue. It is common ground that the EP was grounded on section 32(b) EOA which reads as follows:-

    The election of a candidate at any election shall be declared to be void on an election petition on any of the following grounds only which may be proved to the satisfaction of the Election Judge: (b) non-compliance with the provisions of any written law relating to the conduct of any election if it appears that the election was not conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in such written law and that such non-compliance affected the result of the election.

21. The provision clearly places the burden on the Appellant to prove to the satisfaction of the Election Judge that:

    1. there has been non-compliance with the provisions of the written law relating to the conduct of the elections; and

    2. the said non-compliance has affected the result of the elections.

22. There is no doubt in our minds that the two (2) limbs in section 32(b) are to be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. There is no dearth of authorities to support such interpretation.

23. In Re Election Petition of Cheah Seng Teik [1958] 24 MLJ 275, Rigby J held as follows (at page 277):

    The only remaining subsection available to the petitioner for the purposes of this Petition is 32(b). That subsection provides that the election of a candidate may be declared void on an election petition for ‘non-compliance with the provisions of any written law relating to any election, if it appears that the election was not conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in such written law and that such non-compliance affected the result of the election’. It is to be noted that mere non-compliance with the provisions of such written law is not, by itself, sufficient to avoid the election; the non-compliance must have affected the result of the election.

24. In Isahak Hamid v Mustapha [1965] 2 MLJ 18, it was held by Ismail Khan J (as he then was) at page 19:-

    It is clear that the ground stated in the petition for the relief claimed brings it within the ambit of Section 32(b) of the Ordinance. To succeed, however, the petitioner has to establish that not only was there a non-compliance with the provisions of the section, but that because of such non-compliance the election was not conducted according to the principles of such election law and further that such non-compliance has affected the result of the election.

25. The same interpretation was adopted by MT Chang J (as he then was) in Mohamed Jaafar v Sulaiman [1970] 1 MLJ 18, wherein his Lordship said (at page 19):-

    On a proper interpretation, regulation 31 read together with Section 32(b) of the Act clearly establishes that non-compliance either with the provisions of any written law relating to any elections or with any of the regulations relating to elections is per se not fatal unless the election has not been conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in such law and such non-compliance affect the results of the election .... Before an election court can declare any election void for reasons of non-compliance with the provisions either of any written law or of any regulations relating to elections, it must be satisfied, among other things, that the failure of compliance affects the results of the election.

26. Dealing with the same issue in the case of Tg. Nawawi Tengku Abd. Kadir v Lokman Muda [1996] 1 CLJ 551 Abdul Hamid Mohamed J (as he then was) had this to say at page 561-563:-

    Both parties spent a long time submitting on section 32(b). So I will discuss it now. Concerning this section there are judgments of Election Judges in Malaysia which say that a petitioner is responsible to prove and satisfy the Election Judge that there has been non-compliance with the provisions of any written laws relating to general election and that the non-compliance has affected the outcome of the election - see Muip Tabib v James Wong [1971] 1 MLJ 246 and Mohamed Jaafar v Sulaiman [1970] 1 MLJ 18. There are differing opinions on level of proof. Some say, like in civil cases, and others say like in criminal cases. But, in this case there is no accusation of bribery, hence the question of proof like that of criminal cases does not arise. So the first question is has the petitioner succeeded in proving non-compliance with any written laws relating to general election? ....

    Relating to section 10 of General Election Act 1958, I am satisfied that Pui Beng Jee has registered two times, once under the name Pui Beng Jee and once under the name Hassan Abdullah. This contravened the provisions of section 10. But there is no proof that he had voted once, twice or not at all. Unfortunately, if he voted twice, his act will not affect the outcome of the election, another condition that must be satisfied under section 32(b).

27. The provisions of our section 32(b) EOA are very clear. We would reiterate that the onus is on the petitioner to prove to the satisfaction of the Election Judge that there is non-compliance with the provisions of any written law relating to election and that such non-compliance affects the result of the election.

28. Learned counsel for the Appellant in his submission earlier had urged this court to follow the interpretation given to section 32(b) in three (3) cases namely,

    1. Abdul Hamid Mamat v Baharuddin Mohd [1993] I AMR 1.

    2. Re Tanjung Puteri State Election Petition [1988] 2 MLJ 111.

    3. Harris Salleh v The Returning Officer Ismail Majin [2001] 3 MLJ 433.

29. These cases, in interpreting section 32(b) adopted the interpretation given to section 37(1) Representation of the People Act 1949 of England by Lord Denning in the case of Morgan v Simpson [1974] 3 All ER 722 which reads the section disjunctively, to wit “the court can still declare the election void even if the irregularities do not affect the outcome of the election.”

30. A comparison between our section 32(b) and section 37(1) of the English statute would reveal the stark difference between both sections. Section 37(1) is worded as follows:

    No local government election shall be declared invalid by reason of any act or omission of the returning officer or any other person in breach of his official duty in connection with the election or otherwise of the local elections rules if it appears to the tribunal having cognizance of the question that the election was so conducted as to be substantially in accordance with the law as to elections and that the act or omission did not affect its result.

31. That section is expressed in the negative. It says when an election is not to be declared invalid. However in Morgan (supra) Lord Denning M.R. thought that the section should be transformed so as to read positively as follows:-

    A local government election shall be declared invalid (by reason of any act or omission of the returning officer or any other person in breach of his official duty in connection with the election or otherwise of the local election rules) if it appears to the tribunal having cognizance of the question that the election was not so conducted as to be substantially in accordance with the law as to elections or that the act or omission did affect the result. [emphasis added]

32. In comparison, our section 32(b) is already worded in the positive. It reads as follows:-

    32.

    The election of a candidate at any election shall be declared to be void on an election petition on any of the following grounds which may be proved to the satisfaction of the Election Judge: (b) non-compliance with the provisions of any written law relating to any election if it appears that the election was not conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in such written law and that such non-compliance affected the result of the election.

33. Our courts have consistently required that non-compliance must affect the result of the election by construing the provision as it is worded. The cases of Re Election Petition of Cheah Seng Teik, Isahak Hamid v Mustapha, Mohamed Jaafar v Sulaiman and Tg. Nawawi v Lokman Muda (supra) which we have mentioned earlier will attest to this.

34. Again, in dealing with the interpretation of section 32(b), Abdul Hamid Mohamed J (as he then was) in Ang Thye Chin v Chua Kow [1996] 1 CLJ 49 had this to say (at page 58):-

    It is clear that in the 21 years since this provision came into existence Election Judges in this country are of the same opinion insofar as its meaning is concerned although through different paths: some without reference to any cases at all, some referred to English cases decided in the year 1875, and some referred to Indian cases only. But all their decisions are the same. It was only since the beginning of 1988 Wan Yahya J (as he then was) in Tanjung Puteri Johore State Election Petition, Abdul Razak Ahmad v Md Yunus Sulaiman [1988] 2 MLJ 111 suddenly followed the view of Lord Denning MR in the case of Morgan v Simpson [1974] 3 AllER 722. This case was followed by Ahmad Fairuz J in Abdul Hameed Mamat v Ustaz Baharuddin Mohd [1993] Malal's Digest. In making this election, my approach is simple. First, the Court's duty is not to make laws. This is for Parliament to do. The Court's duty is to give effect to laws created by Parliament whether or not the Court agrees with them. Secondly, if the laws passed by Parliament is unclear there is no need for Courts to venture to other countries in search of authorities to interprete the provision concerned. Thirdly, if there are judgments of Courts of this country, what more if they are unanimous and over a long period of time, we should not abandon them and accept a new interpretation made by judges of another country in deciding cases in that country according to the laws of that country, the circumstances and practices of that country.

    And at page 60 –

    In the circumstances, I am more incline to follow the view that had existed for so long in our country instead of that of Lord Denning's. Our laws are clear and has been drafted in a positive form, and they need not be re-drafted again from negative to positive as was done by Lord Denning MR to the laws of his country. So, in my conclusion, under section 32(b), the election of any candidate in an election must be declared void if the Election Judge is satisfied that as a result of non-compliance with the provisions of any written laws relating to election, the election was not carried out in accordance with the principles laid down in written laws and that the non-compliance affects the outcome of the election.

35. In Home Luck Investments Sdn Bhd v Commissioner of Federal Capital of Kuala Lumpur [1969] 1 MLJ 248, Raja Azlan Shah J (as His Highness then was) rejected the usage of English rating laws. His Lordship had this to say:-

    It is beyond doubt that the core of our laws has, broadly speaking, been derived from English laws but we must not forget that we have our own laws, our own economic and social life and our own peculiar problems which we have to solve. We must therefore be cautious  not to depend for guidance too heavily and too uncritically on English insight and experience of the working of their rating law and the solution of their problems.

36. In Foo Loke Ying v Television Broadcast Ltd [1985] 2 MLJ 35, the then Supreme Court speaking through that distinguished judge Abdoolcader SCJ (as he then was) stated that the Court is not at liberty to treat words in a statute as mere tautology or surplusage  unless they are wholly meaningless. On the presumption that Parliament does nothing in vain, the court must endeavour to give significance to every word of an enactment, and it is presumed that if a word or phrase appears in a statute, it was put there for a purpose and must not be disregarded.

37. Further, in Chin Choy v Collector of Stamp Duties [1979] 1 MLJ 69, the Federal Court stated that applying the words and phrases of a statute in their ordinary meaning has been said to be the first and most elementary rule of construction and the second is said to be to construe the phrases and sentences according to the rules of grammar.

38. Bearing in mind the above authorities, we must say with respect that Lord Denning’s approach in the case of Morgan v Simpson (supra) cannot be applied here as our section 32(b) on which the Appellant’s petition is based is crystal clear in its language. To accept such an interpretation would defeat Parliament’s intention in enacting section 32(b).

39. Next, we need to ascertain the meaning of the phrase “the result of the election” as provided in section 32(b).

40. In Isahak Hamid v Mustapha (supra) Ismail Khan J (as he then was) held ‘the result of the election’ to mean the success of one candidate over the other. This is what his Lordship said (at page 21):-

    I also hold that the non-compliance of the law by the returning officer had not affected the result of such election, that is, the success of one candidate over the other. [emphasis added]

41. In para 581, Halsbury’s Laws of England volume 15, the word ‘result’ is explained to mean “the success of one candidate over another and not merely an alteration in the number of votes given to each candidate.”

42. Since the EP was grounded on section 32(b) the petitioner must prove to the satisfaction of the Election Judge that the non-compliance has affected the result of the said election, namely the election of the Third Respondent with a majority of 2,728 votes.

43. We do agree with the submission of learned counsel for the Appellant that due emphasis should be given to the overriding principles of democracy and the need to protect the purity of the election process but at the same time we cannot ignore the elementary rule of construction that where the meaning of the words in a statute is plain and unambiguous, as in this case, the court is left with no choice but to give effect to its plain meaning. It is not for us judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning.

44. We shall now move on to the Factual issue. During the trial before the Election Judge, the following facts were not in dispute:

    1. There had been non-compliance of Regulation 11(5) and Form 8 because the polling hours were extended from 5.00 p.m. to 7.00 p.m.;

    2. There had been non-compliance of Regulation 14A because on nomination day, the Appellant was supplied with electoral rolls dated 5th March 2004, whereas on polling day the electoral rolls used were dated 15th March 2004  for Taman Greenwood and  16th  March 2004 for Taman Sri Gombak.

45. In his effort to prove that the non-compliance of Regulation 11(5) and Form 8 i.e. the extension of polling hours from 5.00 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. has affected the result of the said election, the Appellant had in paragraph 4.1 of his EP, listed 87 names of persons to whom ballot papers had been issued after 5.00 p.m. on 21st March 2004. However, none of the 87 persons listed in the EP had been called to give evidence confirming that they had been issued with ballot papers after 5.00 p.m.

46. Even assuming that they had been issued with ballot papers and their votes were deducted from the majority, the Third Respondent would still have won the election with a winning majority of 2,641 votes [2,728-87 = 2,641]. In any case, the figures given by the witnesses for the Appellant were mere estimates and none of the witnesses could verify the figure showing how many voters came to vote after 5.00 p.m.

47. Further, in his judgment appearing at pages 49 – 51 of the appeal record the learned Election Judge had also made a finding of fact that the maximum figure of 314 provided by the Appellant’s witnesses by itself could not have affected the result of the election as the Third Respondent would still have won with a majority of 2,414 votes [2,728 – 314 = 2,414].

48. Next, in trying to prove that the non-compliance of Regulation 14 (A) had affected the result of the election, the Appellant in paragraph 4.2 of the EP pleaded that he was on nomination day given the electoral rolls dated 5th March 2004 but the electoral rolls used on polling day were dated 15th March 2005 and 16th March 2004. The existence of different electoral rolls only involved two polling stations, namely Taman Greenwood and Taman Sri Gombak.

49. Under item (d) of paragraph 4.2 of the EP which appears at page 191 of volume 1 of the appeal record, the Appellant also alleged that the existence of different electoral rolls had given the opportunity to voters to vote twice, and the Appellant had listed three (3) names.

50. From the three (3) names listed in the EP, only Mansor Ishak was called to give evidence. According to his evidence this witness said that although he had the opportunity to vote twice, he nevertheless voted only once. Even if he had voted twice (which is an offence) it is our view that this could not have affected the result of the election.

51. On record, there is no evidence at all to prove the allegation that a voter had voted twice. It therefore remains a presumption. Even if a voter had voted twice, there is no evidence to suggest that he had voted for the Third Respondent. It would be wrong, therefore, to assume that the Third Respondent had won because of these votes.

52. The learned Election Judge in his judgment at pages 52-53 of the appeal record also made a finding of fact that although there were allegations of double voting by SP 13 and SP 16 due to the existence of different electoral rolls, these allegations nevertheless remained allegations as there was no evidence to support them. In any case the learned Judge found that even if the allegations were taken into consideration, there was still no evidence to show that the problem was so widespread as to have affected the result of the election.

53. Although the Respondents did not dispute that there were non-compliance with Regulations 11(5), 14A and Form 8 the Appellant is still required to prove that the non-compliance have affected the result of the election. From the evidence adduced before the election court we find that the Appellant had failed to do so.

54. At the risk of repetition, we would once again say that all the cases we have cited above appear to suggest that the Appellant needs to prove not only non-compliance but also that the non-compliance have affected the result of the election. This same view was echoed by this Court in Gan Joon Zin v Fong Kui Lun [2004] 4 CLJ 729. However, learned counsel for the Appellant in his submission, expressed the view that the Federal Court in Gan Joon Zin (supra) did not fully discuss the issue involving section 32(b). He was therefore of the view that the observation made by the court that it was necessary to prove that the non-compliance have affected the result of the election, was a mere obiter and this court is not obliged to follow that decision following the doctrine of stare decisis. 

55. We feel a brief background facts in Gan Joon Zin (supra) is necessary in order to put the matter in its proper perspective. This was the first case that has come to the Federal Court by way of an appeal since the amendment to the EOA 1954.

56. The appeal is against the decision of the Election Judge striking out the EP on a preliminary objection. In the EP, the Appellant was seeking for a declaration that the election was void or that the First Respondent was not duly elected or ought not to have been returned based on five grounds. One of the grounds is that the First Respondent carried out election campaign in contravention of section 24B (1), (4), (6), (7), and (10) and section 32 (b) and (c) of the Act.

57. The Second and Third Respondents raised preliminary objections on three grounds one of which is that the EP does not satisfy the mandatory requirements of Regulation 4(1)(b) of the said Rules read with Section 32(b) of the Act as the EP lacked facts and grounds alleging that the non-compliance of written law relating to the conduct of elections had affected the result of the election.

58. After hearing submissions on the preliminary objections, the learned Judge held that the said EP was defective as the mandatory requirements were not met. As such the EP was struck out with costs.

59. At the hearing of the appeal before the Federal Court the Respondents raised yet another preliminary objection that the Appellant had ‘no locus standi’ to maintain the appeal. At the close of submissions by parties on the preliminary objection, the same was upheld by the court. However, since full arguments were also heard on the appeal, the court proceeded to deal with the appeal proper.

60. Having heard arguments on the appeal, the Federal Court agreed with the decision of the learned Election Judge and had this to say (at page 745) with regard to the provision of section 32(b):-

    The learned judge referred to a number of authorities to support his view. We do not think that we have to discuss them. It is sufficient merely to say that S.32(b) is too clear for anyone to have any doubt that the election of a candidate may only be declared to be void on any one of the grounds provided therein. To avoid the election on ground (b) i.e. of non-compliance with the relevant law, it must be proved that there was not only non-compliance but also that such non-compliance had affected the result of the election. [emphasis added]

61. In our view, the above observation reflects the correct statement of the law on the construction of section 32(b). That being the case, there is no reason for us to depart from the view expressed by the Federal Court in Gan Joon Zin (supra).

62. Having said that and based on the foregoing reasons and the authorities quoted above it is our unanimous decision that this appeal should be dismissed with costs. We would also order that the deposit be paid out to the Respondents to account for their taxed costs and confirm the orders of the learned Judge.

63. My learned brothers Steve LK Shim CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) and Pajan Singh Gill FCJ have seen this judgment in draft and expressed their agreement with it.

Cases

Re Tanjung Puteri Johore State Election Petition [1998] 2 MLJ 111; Morgan v Simpson [1974] 3 All ER 722; Abdul Hamid Mamat v Baharuddin Mohd [1993] 1 AMR 1; Harris Salleh v The Returning Officer Ismail Majin [2001] 3 MLJ 433; Dr. Lee Chong Meng v Returning Officer (Abdul Rahman Abdullah (No.1) [2003] 3 CLJ 519; Bong Geok Beng v Ahmad Nordin [1980] 1 MLJ 167; Chong Thain Vun v Watson [1968] 1 MLJ 65; Norbert Choong v Mohd. Idris Ibrahim [1980] 1 MLJ 316; Patau Rubis v Patrick Uren [1984] 2 CLJ (Rep) 348; Rhina Bhar v Karpal Singh Ram Singh [1995] 4 CLJ 642; Re Election Petition of Cheah Seng Teik [1958] 24 MLJ 275; Isahak Hamid v Mustapha [1965] 2 MLJ 18; Mohamed Jaafar v Sulaiman [1970] 1 MLJ 18; Tg. Nawawi Tengku Abd. Kadir v Lokman Muda [1996] 1 CLJ 551; Ang Thye Chin v Chua Kow [1996] 1 CLJ 49; Home Luck Investments Sdn Bhd v Commissioner of Federal Capital of Kuala Lumpur [1969] 1 MLJ 248; Foo Loke Ying v Television Broadcast Ltd [1985] 2 MLJ 35; Chin Choy v Collector of Stamp Duties [1979] 1 MLJ 69; Gan Joon Zin v Fong Kui Lun [2004] 4 CLJ 729

Legislations

Election Offences Act 1954: s.32, s.35, s.36A

Elections (Conduct of Election) Regulations 1981: Reg.11, Reg.14A, Reg.23, Form 8

Evidence Act: s.114(g)

Representation of the People Act 1949 [UK]: s.37

Authors and other references

Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol.15

Representations

Messrs. Radzi & Abdullah for appellant

Federal Counsel for Respondent