www.ipsofactoJ.com/archive/index.htm [1988] Part 6 Case 8 [HCM]    

 

HIGH COURT OF MALAYA

 

Cocoa Processors Sdn Bhd

- vs -

United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd

Coram

MOHAMED DZAIDDIN J

15 APRIL 1988

Judgment

Mohamed Dzaiddin J

  1. In these applications, the defendants have asked this court for an order that the interim injunction granted to the plaintiff by this court on 3 April 1987 be dissolved. By the said order of 3 April 1987, the defendants were restrained from disposing, selling, dealing with the assets of the plaintiff pending the final determination of the plaintiff’s action and/or until further order. Further the third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants, being receivers and managers appointed under the debentures, were restrained from issuing any prospectus or releasing information pertaining to the trade and production methods of the plaintiff or allowing any inspection of the plaintiff’s production methods to a third party. In short, the first and second defendants are restrained from exercising their rights under the terms of the various debentures which I shall refer to shortly.

  2. The ex parte application (encl 5) of the plaintiff was supported by the affidavit of Mr. Alan Rajendram, the executive director of the plaintiff company, dated 31 March 1987 where in addition to the facts stated therein he relied on the averments in the plaintiff’s statement of claim as grounds for seeking the interim injunction.

  3. The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated in Malaysia and runs a factory at Parit Buntar industrial estate carrying on the business of cocoa processing. Both the first and second defendants, who are bankers, are the main financiers of the plaintiff’s business and pursuant to the various credit facilities granted by them to the plaintiff, all-moneys debentures were created by the plaintiff in favour of the first and second defendants whereby the plaintiff covenanted to pay the defendants on demand, all moneys due or owing under any account or under any banking facilities whatsoever. The first debenture dated 24 June 1981 was created to secure a loan of $3m. Subsequently, on 7 and 12 January 1982, it was upstamped to secure facilities up to $5m, and was further upstamped on 10 December 1982 up to $6.1m. Finally, on 11 September 1984 it was upstamped to secure facilities up to $6.6m.

  4. On 6 September 1984, a second debenture was created by the plaintiff in favour of the first defendant, upon the first defendant lending the first plaintiff $3m. The plaintiff undertook to pay on demand the said sum of $3m together with interest at the rate of 3.5% pa above the first defendant’s base lending rate for the time being or at such other rates fixed by the first defendant in its discretion. All the terms contained in the first debenture apply to the second debenture.

  5. The relevant terms of the first debenture dated 24 June 1981 granted to the first defendant are as follows:

    (a)

    the bank is entitled to charge interest at 13% pa or such other rate fixed by it in its sole discretion. The statement of certain designated bank officers would be final and conclusive on any outstanding balances (cl 1);

    (b)

    the securities created by the first debenture would be continuing ones for all moneys owing to the bank (cl 4);

    (c)

    the securities created by the debenture include a first fixed charge over a piece of immovable property duly identified in the schedule thereto and a first floating charge over all the undertakings, properties and assets of the company (cl 6);

    (d)

    the bank may, at any time, in its absolute discretion convert the floating charge to a fixed charge (cl 7);

    (e)

    the company covenanted to carry on and operate its business and affairs ‘with due diligence and efficiency’ (cl 11);

    (f)

    the moneys secured under the debenture shall become immediately payable to the bank upon the happening of any one of seven specified events, including default of the company in payment of any moneys payable thereunder (cl 14(b);

    (g)

    if the moneys became payable under cl 14, the bank has three remedies, including the right to appoint receivers and managers over the properties and assets charged under the debenture (cl 15(c);

    (h)

    the powers of the receivers and managers so appointed include the power to take possession of all properties and assets charged under the debenture; to carry on and manage the business of the company and to sell or otherwise deal with the charged properties and assets (cl 16);

    (i)

    the receivers and managers so appointed shall be the company’s agents and the company shall be solely responsible for their acts or defaults and for their remuneration (cl 18);

    (j)

    the company shall ‘do all things necessary to enable’ the bank and/or the receivers and managers to complete any sale of any charged properties and assets (cl 19);

    (k)

    no failure or delay on the part of the bank in exercising or omitting to exercise any right or remedy under the debenture shall be construed as a waiver thereof or acquiescence for such inaction (cl 25);

    (l)

    the company shall pay the fees of the solicitors retained by the bank on a solicitor and own client basis in the event that litigation ensues as a result of breaches of the debenture by the company (cl 32).

    These debentures created by the plaintiff had been duly registered with the Registrar of Companies under s 108 of the Companies Act 1965.

  6. It is the plaintiff’s case that the said debentures were created strictly on the express conditions as contained in the respective letters of offer from the first and second defendants and that the facilities were used in respect of the working capital for the plaintiff’s factory. The plaintiff alleged that on or around 24 April 1986, both the first and second defendants jointly purportedly appointed the third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants as receivers and managers under the respective debentures and such appointment was made on the grounds that the plaintiff had defaulted in the repayments of the various sums due under the credit facilities granted by both defendants.

  7. Upon the grounds stated hereunder, the plaintiff contended that the said appointment of receivers and managers is wrong, invalid and contrary to law:

    1. At the material time of the appointment of receivers and managers, the plaintiff was not in default of any repayment of loans due to the first and second defendants. However, they admitted that they were only in arrears of their loan repayments to the first defendant for a period of nearly one year. The plaintiff alleged that the first defendant had waived or elected to waive the immediate payment of such arrears since they were aware that the plaintiff was undergoing a massive restructuring exercise which involved the backward and forward integration programme. Further, the plaintiff alleged that both the first and second defendants were aware of this exercise and also knew the reasons for the poor performance of the plaintiff’s factory and the reasons for the problems arising from the repayment of the facilities.

    2. In the case of the second defendant, the plaintiff alleged that notwithstanding the arrears of the obligations in respect of the first defendant’s loan, the second defendant with full knowledge carried on and continued to grant revolving credit facilities on a rollover basis from time to time and thereafter these facilities were further extended whereby it was agreed that the facilities should be continued until 30 September 1986. Notwithstanding that the plaintiff was not in default in respect of the credit facilities given by the second defendant on the ground mentioned above, the plaintiff alleged that the second defendant on or about 15 April 1986, through their solicitors, terminated the said credit facilities and demanded immediate payment of the full amount owing. Consequently, on or about 24 April 1986, the second defendant appointed the third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants as receivers and managers.

    3. The plaintiff also alleged that both defendants had acted mala fide when they placed the plaintiff under receivership thereby causing irreparable losses and that such appointment had caused great harm in that the reputation and goodwill of the plaintiff had been adversely affected, and had further frustrated the plaintiff’s restructuring and integration programme.

    4. As against the third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants, the plaintiff alleged that they are acting in a manner contrary to the interest of both the lenders and borrowers and in particular contrary to the terms of the debentures and of other duties and obligations under the law.

  8. On 31 March 1987, the plaintiff commenced action against all the defendants seeking a declaration that the appointment of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants as receivers and managers was wrong, illegal and invalid. On the same day, the plaintiff filed his ex parte summons for an interim injunction against the defendants, which I heard on 3 April 1987 and made an order in terms.

  9. I shall first deal with the application of the first defendant (encl 31), which is supported by the affidavit of Mr. Leong Pak Cheong affirmed on 29 November 1987. This application merely concerns the first part of the injunction order. Part II of Mr. Leong’s affidavit contains replies to specific matters raised in Mr. Rajendram’s affidavit. In Pt III, he sets out the grounds upon which this injunction should be dissolved. Before I go on to examine the grounds, let me first state the obvious, i.e. that the validity of all the debentures in the applications before me are not disputed. The crucial issue in the writ and in the present proceeding relates to the appointment of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants as receivers and managers under the terms of the debentures.

  10. The grounds raised by the first defendant in Mr. Leong’s affidavit can be summarized as follows.

  11. Mr. Thomas, for the first defendant, submitted six grounds why the present injunction against his client should be dissolved. Besides the three grounds mentioned above, learned counsel submitted that there is no serious question to be tried on the plaintiff’s writ of summons under the American Cyanamid [1975] AC 396 test. Secondly, the plaintiff’s action impinges and prejudices the first defendant as debenture holder qua debenture holder by threatening or imperiling the assets which are the subject matter of the fixed and floating charge (see: Kerr on Receivers, 14th Ed (1972), p 301 — under the heading ‘Effect of Appointment’). Learned counsel also contended that the plaintiff acting through the directors cannot properly bring the present action. He cited three cases, which showed that on a valid appointment of the receivers and managers, the court had refused to grant the injunction made by the company (see Shamji v Johnson Mathey Bankers [1986] BCLC 278, Bank of Baroda v Panessar [1987] 2 WLR 208 and Re Neon Signs (Australia) Ltd [1965] VR 125.

  12. Mr. Charles Ong, counsel for the plaintiff, in his reply contended that the third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants were wrongly appointed. He relied entirely on the facts as deposed in Mr. Rajendram’s affidavit (encl 6). Learned counsel conceded that moneys were owing to the first defendant, but questioned whether these moneys were due at the material time of the appointment of the receivers and managers. He mentioned the moratorium given by the first defendant to the plaintiff and submitted that even on this issue there is a serious question to be tried. In the result, counsel submitted that the injunction should remain, at least pending the disposal of the plaintiff’s application to lift or suspend the receivership and their consequential orders prayed for in summons-in-chambers (encl 7).

  13. Having considered the entire supporting affidavits and the various exhibits as well as the submissions of counsel, I come to the following conclusions:

    1. From the debentures and other documents including various correspondences, I am satisfied that the banking facilities and securities are governed by the two debentures created by the plaintiff in favour of the first defendant. I do not agree that the facilities given were based on the express conditions stated in the letters of offer given by the first defendant.

    2. Under the first debenture, it is clearly provided that the moneys secured shall become immediately payable to the first defendant upon the happening of any one of seven specified events, which includes default of the plaintiff in payment of any moneys thereunder. It is also provided that after the moneys become payable under cl 14, the first defendant has three remedies, including the right to appoint receivers and managers over the properties and assets charged under the debentures.

    3. Based on the facts narrated in Pt I of Mr. Leong’s affidavit, the contents of which had not been challenged by the plaintiff and pursuant to cll 14(b) and 15(c) of the first debenture, it is my finding that the third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants were validly appointed. Perhaps, I should stress here that upon considering the entire correspondences and in particular the letters exhibited to Mr. Leong’s affidavit and marked as LPC1, LPC2, LPC3, LPC4 and LPC5, I am satisfied that the plaintiff was given ample time and opportunities to repay the various loans and facilities owing to the first defendant. The plaintiff did ask for time and more time was what they got. Yet, despite the time given in terms of an agreed moratorium and despite several promises made, the plaintiff, at the end of the day was not able to honour the promises made.

    4. Therefore, for the above reasons, I entirely agree with Mr. Thomas’ submission that there is no serious question to be tried on the pleadings under the well-known American Cyanamid test. Hence on this ground alone the present injunction should be dissolved. However, I shall also consider other grounds.

    5. Based on the affidavit of Mr. Leong, I find that the plaintiff has failed to disclose material facts which are relevant to the granting of the interim injunction. I refer to the documents marked as LPC1, LPC2, LPC3, LPC4 and LPC5 in encl 30. To me these correspondences are material to the plaintiff’s application because they show the sincerity of the first defendant in trying to solve the problem faced by the plaintiff. Further and more importantly, these documents seem to show the lack of concrete proposals of the plaintiff in trying to settle the outstandings resulting in the appointment of the receivers and managers. It is established law that a party applying for an ex parte injunction is bound to state not only the facts he considers material but also all facts within his knowledge which are material (Daglish v Jarrie (1851) 120 LJ Ch 475) otherwise the order may be set aside without regard to the merits (Thermax Ltd v Schott Industries Glass Ltd [1981] FSR 289). In the circumstances, the interim injunction should be dissolved on this ground.

    6. The next material ground is the delay on the part of the plaintiff to apply for the interim injunction. It is not disputed that the plaintiff had taken 11 months from the time the third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants were appointed as receivers and managers before applying to this court for the interim injunction. Of course, I take note of the principal reason given by the plaintiff to explain their delay, which I interpret to mean that they were expediting the restructuring programme and even obtained the services of a merchant bank to try to find a solution to their problem. One wonders if it really took the plaintiff nearly a year to resolve their problem before they filed a writ and applied for the interim injunction. With respect, I am not impressed with this explanation and in my opinion the delay of 11 months is too long and amounts to an acquiescence by the plaintiff in the first defendant’s conduct by appointing the receivers and managers and in the circumstances the said delay does not entitle the plaintiff to the assistance of this court.

    7. I am also satisfied that there is no sufficient evidence of acts of mala fides and any allegation of that sort is unfounded.

    8. Finally, taking up further the grounds raised by Mr. Thomas, it is pertinent that I pose the following question: Having held that the receivers and managers were validly appointed under the terms of the debentures, can the plaintiff company acting through the directors bring this present action? Following the three authorities cited by counsel, in my opinion, they cannot. In Shamji, the mortgagee was given the power to appoint a receiver to protect his interest and it was held that the decision of the mortgagee to exercise this power could not be challenged except perhaps on the ground of bad faith. In that case the plaintiff alleged that the mortgagee acted wrongfully and in breach of contract by appointing receivers of the assets and undertakings of various companies of his group. They claimed an injunction to restrain the receiver from acting, and damages. In Bank of Baroda, the defendant did not dispute the validity of the appointment of the receiver and cooperated with him in releasing assets through the course of his receivership. In an action by the bank under the guarantees the defendants alleged, inter alia, that the receiver had not been validly appointed. Judgment was given for the bank. In Re Neon Signs, the court held that in the absence of any evidence of dishonest or reckless exercise of the powers of a receiver, the court will not interfere with the exercise by debenture holders through their receivers acting on their behalf and their authority of such powers as were given to them by a company as incident to their security. What happened in this case was that the company gave notice of intention to move for an order for the removal of the receiver and also for an injunction restraining him from disclosing the documents and contracts concerning the company. On the same day, the company applied to the judge ex parte for an injunction against the receiver claiming like relief. After hearing argument the judge decided to refuse the application to continue such injunction. Based on the above authorities, it is clear that except on the ground of bad faith, the court will not interfere with the exercise of the powers of debenture holders under the debenture.

    From the above conclusions, I allow the first defendant’s application and order that the interim injunction dated 3 April 1987 be dissolved with costs.

  14. Turning next to the application of the second defendant (encl 40) the bank relied on the supporting affidavit of its Assistant General Manager, Mr. Woo Khai Yoon (encl 39). Part A of his affidavit gives a background of the loan transactions. Part C of his affidavit provides the grounds on which the second defendant relies to dissolve the interim injunction.

  15. After considering the affidavits and listening to the submissions of both counsel, I come to the same conclusion as I found in the similar issues raised in the first defendant’s application and I adopt similar reasons for my finding. At this stage, I need not amplify my reasons in respect of the second defendant’s application. Suffice it to say that I am of the opinion that the plaintiff also has no arguable case against the second defendant and they have shown that the appointment of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants as receivers and managers under the debenture dated 24 November 1984 is valid and proper. In the result, the interim injunction granted by this court dated 3 April 1987 be and is hereby dissolved with costs.

  16. Finally, I shall now deal with the joint application of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants (encl 43) which is supported by the affidavit of Mr. Gong Wee Ning, the third defendant (encl 34). I find the answer to their application is quite straight-forward. In view of my finding that they were validly appointed by the first and second defendants under the terms of the respective debentures, their application to dissolve this injunction, and more particularly, the second limb of the said order must be allowed with costs. I have read the affidavit of Mr. Gong and I am satisfied that he had explained and rebutted the various allegations of the plaintiff. I have no reason to disbelieve him. I also find that there is no sufficient ground for the plaintiff to allege that the receivers were negligent or acted contrary to the terms of the debentures or had acted mala fide.

  17. I think in order to appreciate the various allegations made against the receivers, it is instructive that we should know what their functions are. In this regard, I now quote the speech of Shaw LJ in Newhart Developments v Cooperative Commercial Bank Ltd [1978] 2 WLR 636 (CA) at p 641:

    One has got to see what the function of the receiver is. It is not, of course, to wind up the company. It is perhaps interesting to note in passing that when a liquidator is appointed, certainly in a winding up by the court, the powers of the directors immediately cease by statutory provision. There is no such provision in relation to the appointment of a receiver, whose duty is to protect the interests of the mortgagee or debenture holders, as the case may be ....

  18. There is in the debenture deed itself, a provision to the effect that the receiver may carry on the business of the company or concur in carrying on its business, which itself demonstrates that there is not a total extinction of the function of the directors. It is only within the scope of its assets which are covered by the debenture, and only in so far as it is necessary to apply those assets in the best possible way in the interests of the debenture holders that the receiver has a real function.

  19. Therefore, for reasons stated above, I allow the defendants’ applications to dissolve the injunction granted by order dated 3 April 1987 with costs.

    16 MAY 1988

    Mohamed Dzaiddin J

  20. On 29 September 1987 and 22 February 1988, I heard submissions of counsel for the defendants on their applications to dissolve the ex parte interim injunction, which I granted, against all the defendants on 3 April 1987 restraining them from disposing, selling, dealing etc with the assets of the plaintiff’s company through the third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants who were appointed receivers and managers under the debentures. On 15 April 1988, I delivered my judgment allowing the defendants’ application with costs.

  21. Immediately thereafter, Mr. Charles Ong, counsel for the plaintiff, upon his undertaking to file the notice of appeal against my above decision to the Supreme Court, moved orally for a further limited interim injunction pending the hearing of the appeal. Counsel stated that he was making the application under the principles in Erinford Properties v Cheshire County Council [1974] 2 All ER 448. Quite naturally, Mr. Ghazi who appeared for the defendants opposed the application. On 30 April 1988, I heard the arguments of counsel.

  22. Mr. Balasundaram, who appeared with Mr. Charles Ong, submitted that I should exercise my discretion in allowing a further interim injunction pending an appeal for the following reasons. He stated that the concern of the plaintiff was to preserve the status quo pending the hearing of an appeal against my judgment, the notice of appeal having already been filed. Under the Erinford principle, when a party is appealing, exercising his undoubted right of appeal, the court ought to see that the appeal if successful is not nugatory. Undoubtedly, counsel was conscious of my strong reasons for dissolving the ex parte interim injunction. Nevertheless, he felt that the likelihood of a successful appeal being rendered nugatory was a sufficient ground for me to grant the plaintiff’s application. Counsel further submitted that the receivers would not be prejudiced by the interim injunction and in addition, the first and second defendants had a registered charge over the properties of the plaintiff. Lastly, he felt that there would be no greater hardship rendered to the defendants if the present application was allowed.

  23. Tunku Alina, Miss Solomon and Mr. Ghazi, in opposing the application, submitted mainly on the question of damages and balance of convenience, i.e. graver hardship to the defendants. Tunku Alina submitted that Erinford was not a case in which damages seemed to be a suitable alternative unlike the present case. Miss Solomon submitted that since the appointment of the receivers and managers, the assets of the plaintiff company have depreciated considerably. The value of the plaintiff’s factory and assets as a going concern as at 9 April 1985 was $10 million. But on the day the receivers and managers were appointed i.e. 24 April 1986 it was valued at $4.5 million. On the question of balance of convenience, both Tunku Alina and Miss Solomon submitted that as the appeal may take about six months before it is heard, the prejudice to the first and second defendants would far outweigh the convenience of the plaintiff. Lastly, Mr. Ghazi submitted that the plaintiff had failed to show in what way, if the appeal is successful, it would render the judgment nugatory.

  24. In Erinford reading from the headnote, on the plaintiffs’ motion for an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendant from considering or determining the plaintiffs’ planning application for certain land otherwise than concurrently with another planning application for adjoining land made by the other applicants, judgment was given refusing the injunction. Immediately after the judgment the plaintiffs moved the court ex parte for, and were granted, an injunction in a modified form restraining the defendant from considering the plaintiffs’ planning application for some six days in order to enable the plaintiffs to consider an appeal. The defendant moved the court ex parte to discharge the injunction. Megarry J, in dismissing the motion, held that the court had jurisdiction to grant the injunction and that it was not inconsistent with a decision refusing an interlocutory injunction for the court subsequently to grant a more limited injunction preserving the status quo pending an appeal against that refusal. At p 454, Megarry J set out the principles on which a court should act when deciding whether or not to allow an application granting an injunction pending an appeal:

    There will, of course, be many cases where it would be wrong to grant an injunction pending appeal, as where any appeal would be frivolous, or to grant the injunction would inflict greater hardship than it would avoid, and so on. But subject to that, the principle is to be found in the leading judgment of Cotton LJ in Wilson v Church (No 2) (1879–80) 12 Ch D 454 where, speaking of an appeal from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords, he said, at p 458, ‘.... when a party is appealing, exercising his undoubted right of appeal, this court ought to see that the appeal, if successful, is not nugatory.’ That was the principle which Pennycuick J applied in the Orion case [1962] 1 WLR 1085 and although the cases had not then been cited to me, it was on that principle, and not because I felt any real doubts about my judgment on the motion, that I granted Mr. Newsom the limited injunction pending appeal that he sought. This is not a case in which damages seem to me to be a suitable alternative.

  25. Let me first highlight some salient points of the present case which may assist me in the exercise of my discretion. The plaintiff owed the first and second defendants substantial sums of money secured by the debentures. Upon its failure to pay all the outstandings, the first and second defendants proceeded to appoint receivers and managers over the properties and assets charged under the debentures. The plaintiff then commenced a civil suit against the defendants claiming damages for wrongful appointment of receivers and managers under the debentures. At the same time, it applied for an ex parte interim injunction, which was granted but later dissolved restraining the defendants from disposing, selling and dealing with its assets pending the hearing of the civil suit. In my written grounds of decision in dissolving the ex parte interim injunction I stated, inter alia, quite clearly that there was no serious question to be tried on the pleadings. I held that the receivers and managers were validly appointed. My decision is now pending appeal. Megarry J in Erinford recognized that one of the factors in granting the application was the possibility that the judgment might be reversed or varied. I agree that this is an important factor in favour of the plaintiff. On the other hand, there are other considerations, e.g. ‘where any appeal would be frivolous, or to grant the injunction would inflict greater hardship than it would avoid, and so on’. Therefore, considering the submissions of counsel from the point of view of the Erinford principles, I find merits in the defendants’ objection. Having considered the whole position of the case, I am of the view that whether or not the plaintiff succeeds in the appeal and in the main action will not be affected by its failure to obtain this further interim injunction. It must be remembered that the plaintiff’s claim against the defendants is for damages f or wrongful appointment of receivers and managers. The first and second defendants, being a commercial and merchant bank respectively, will no doubt satisfy any money judgment ordered by the court. Therefore, responding to Mr. Bala’s fear and anxiety on behalf of the plaintiff, I must say quite confidently that there is no likelihood of a successful appeal against my decision being rendered nugatory.

  26. Secondly, a more serious issue to be considered here is the balance of convenience. Based on the facts and circumstances of the present case, I find the balance of convenience lay in favour of the injunction pending appeal being refused. I accept the submission of Miss Solomon that the assets of the plaintiff company had depreciated and the longer it remains in its present position, the greater the hardship being inflicted on the defendants. Further, in the event of the plaintiff’s claim being dismissed, the assets having been depreciated quite considerably, the defendants may not be able to reap the fruits of their success under the debentures. On the other hand, should the plaintiff succeed in its claim ultimately, for damages, the defendants will have no difficulty in settling the judgment.

  27. Lastly, I agree with Tunku Alina that in the present case damages seem to be a suitable and adequate remedy. The plaintiff would be adequately compensated in damages for the temporary damage between now and the date when its appeal is heard if my decision is reversed by the Supreme Court.

  28. For the above reasons, I dismissed the plaintiff’s application for a limited interim injunction pending appeal with costs.

Cases

American Cyanamid v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396; Shamji v Johnson Mathey Bankers [1986] BCLC 278; Bank of Baroda v Panessar [1987] 2 WLR 208; Re Neon Signs (Australia) Ltd v [1965] VR 125; Daglish v Jarrie (1851) 120 LJ Ch 475; Thermax Ltd v Schott Industries Glass Ltd [1981] FSR 289; Newhart Developments v Cooperative Commercial Bank Ltd [1978] 2 WLR 636 (CA); Erinford Properties v Cheshire County Council [1974] 2 All ER 448

Authors and other references

Kerr on Receivers, 14th Ed (1972)

Representations

Charles Ong for the plaintiff.

T Thomas for the first defendant.

Fuliana Solomon (Miss) for the second Fuliana Solomon (Miss) for the second defendant.

Ghazi Ishak for the third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants.

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