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[2000] Part 4 Case 15 [HCM] |
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www.ipsofactoJ.com/highcourt/index.htm
[2000] Part 4 Case 15 [HCM] |
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HIGH COURT OF MALAYA |
Wong
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vs -
Hong Kong Bank Malaysia Bhd
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Coram JAMES FOONG J |
13
MARCH 2000 |
Judgment
James
Foong, J
INTRODUCTION
The
plaintiffs' claim in both cases against the defendants is for negligence in
carrying out an order for sale of their three properties in the town of lpoh
(the said property).
BACKGROUND
The
plaintiffs jointly were the registered owners of property. It was charged to
the first defendant, a bank, by way of a third party charge for financial
facilities granted to a company known as Thong Woh Sawmill & Timber
Merchant Sdn Bhd (the company). The company was unable to repay the loans
due to the first defendant, therefore resulting in a foreclosure proceeding
instituted by the first defendant on the said property.
On
July 24, 1987 the High Court at lpoh granted to the first defendant an order
to sell the said property (order for sale) by way of public auction. Acting
for the first defendant as advocate and solicitor in securing this order for
sale was the second defendant. Pursuant to this order, the Senior Assistant
Registrar (SAR) on April 4, 1988 directed, inter alia that:
The
said property be sold under the direction of the court and the National
Land Code (NLC) for the recovery of monies due to the first defendant
amounting to RM694,169.18 as at July 24, 1987 together with interest of
10.75% per annum from date of judgment to date of satisfaction.
M/s
Colliers Jordan Lee & Jaafar Sdn Bhd to be the auctioneer.
The
reserve price be RM 1,020,000.
The
conditions of sale (conditions of sale) applicable should be that as
contained in a document marked as "B".
The
second defendant do have the conduct of the sale.
On March 25, 1989 the said property was sold to one Tan Kin Tong @ Tan Kean Hoe (the purchaser) for RM1,020,100. This was witnessed by a memorandum of sale (memorandum of sale) executed by the first defendant with the purchaser. Attached to this memorandum of sale and forming a part thereto were the conditions of sale. Upon this purchase, the plaintiffs claim that the purchaser paid to the second defendant his personal cheque for a sum of RM102,010 which forms 10% of the purchase price.
In
the conditions of sale, relevant to the purpose of this case, the following
were specified:
Condition
5 required the payment of 10% deposit to be made to the second defendant
in the form of "cash / banker's cheque or bank draft".
Condition
6 required the purchaser to "be liable to pay any arrears of quit
rent and assessment which may be due in respect of the said
property".
Condition
8 stated that the said property was sold "subject to all existing
tenancies if any, and all claims of tenants and occupiers by contract,
customs, statute or otherwise."
Condition
11 required the balance of the purchase price to be paid by the
purchaser to the second defendant within 90 days from date of the sale
or within seven days from date of receipt of notice from the vendor's
solicitors that possession of the said property can be delivered, which
ever was the earlier date, and that this provision was of the essence of
the contract.
Condition
12 stated that in the event of the purchaser defaulting in payment of
the balance of the purchase price the said property should be put up
again for sale, and the deposit would be forfeited and used to defray
any expenses incurred in the resale of the said property and "the
deficiency in price (if any) which may result on a resale or the balance
of the purchase price if there is no resale shall be recoverable from
the defaulting purchaser, as the case may be".
Condition
17 provided that upon the payment of the balance of the purchase price
the second defendant should prepare a certificate of sale in accordance
with s 259 of the NLC for execution by the SAR.
PLAINTIFFS'
CLAIM
The
plaintiffs now complain that the defendants have wilfully neglected the
conditions of sale by:
having
accepted payment of 10% deposit from the purchaser in the form of a
personal cheque;
failed
to notify the plaintiffs before applying for and obtaining the two
extensions of time for the purchaser to complete the sale;
received
only RM868.520 of the purchase price instead of the full sum of
RM1,020,100 when applying for the certificate of sale from the SAR; and
failed
to collect the difference in the balance of the purchase price amounting
to a sum of RM157,519.
For
this, in suit GS 22-58-1992 the plaintiffs are claiming liquidated damages
of RM386,631.80 which is made up of:
Loss
of RM102,010 (the 10% deposit) with interest thereon at 10% per annum
from March 25, 1989 to February 29, 1992 due to the failure of the
defendants in forfeiting the 10% deposit.
Loss
on the interest on the sum of RM918,090 (the balance of the purchase
price) at the rate of 10% per annum from June 24, 1989 to July 8, 1989
caused by the extensions of time given to the purchaser to pay the
balance of the purchase price.
Loss
of a sum of RM157,510.41 which the second defendant did not collect from
the purchaser and interest due to this amount from July 8, 1989 to
February 29, 1992 at the rate of 11% per annum.
Loss
of additional interest the plaintiffs had to pay to the first defendant
from March 25, 1989 to July 15, 1989 (the period between the date of the
sale of the said property and the completion date) which amounted to
RM25,003.35.
Interest
the plaintiffs had to pay to another bank, Public Bank Bhd, for
facilities granted to the plaintiffs when the said property was
foreclosed.
In
GS No 22-86-1995 the plaintiff is the administrator of the estate of a
deceased who was a co-owner of the said property with the plaintiffs in the
case of GS No 22-58-1992. Since there was a delay in obtaining letters of
administration for this estate, this suit was filed subsequent to GS No
22-58-1992. Both these suits were consolidated. For this case GS No
22-86-1995 the plaintiffs claim:
balance
of the proceeds of sale;
damages;
interest
and cost.
FIRST
DEFENDANT'S DEFENCE IN BOTH SUITS
The
first defendant denies that it owes a duty of care to the plaintiffs. It
insists that its duty in respect of this judicial sale was to take
reasonable care to obtain a true market value of the property at the time of
sale and to deliver the document of title to the purchaser upon the
purchaser completing the sale, and on this duty there was no breach. Other
than this, it owed no other duty of care to the plaintiffs after the fall of
the hammer at the auction. Further, the first defendant explains that the
conduct of the sale was in the hands of the court. Though the second
respondant was its solicitor, the court had ordered the second defendant to
take charge of the sale. By this, the second defendant was no longer its
agent; the second defendant became an agent of the court.
On
the plaintiffs' claim for damages, the first defendant denies that the
plaintiffs are entitled to this.
SECOND
DEFENDANT'S DEFENCE IN BOTH SUITS
The
second defendant's defence is that it owes no duty of care to the
plaintiffs, and even if it did, it had not breached this duty of care for
its actions in the conduct of this sale must be judged and evaluated in the
light of practice existing then, not currently. In any event, the second
defendant insists that alI its acts and / or omissions in respect of this
sale were protected under ss 14 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. In
respect of damages claimed by the plaintiffs, the second defendant denies
that the plaintiffs have suffered any loss, and that their claim is
speculative in nature.
ISSUES
By
the nature of the pleadings I find that the following are the issues for
consideration:
Whether
the defendants owed to the plaintiffs a duty of care?
If
so, was there a breach of this duty of care by the defendants?
And
if there was a breach of this duty of care, whether the second defendant
is protected under s 14 of the Courts of Judicature Act?
If
there is no protection accorded under s 14 of the Courts of Judicature
Act, then whether the damages claimed by the plaintiffs is sustainable?
ANALYSIS
Is
there a duty at care?
Between the plaintiffs and the First defendant, I do not think there is any dispute on the principle that a chargee of a charged property owes a duty of care to the chargor when the charged property is foreclosed. This I believe is based on the respected decision of Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Development & Realtor Sdn Bhd [1992] 2 CLJ 1175. There the learned Judge scouted relevant authorities and arrived at the conclusion that such duty of care existed where the charged property was sold by way of a judicial sale under the National Land Code. The rationale for this stemmed from the proximity of a mortgagor and a mortgagee. As to the scope of this duty the authority accepted the ratio expressed by Salmon LJ in Cuckmere Brick Co Ltd v Mutual Finance Ltd [1971] Ch 949 as:
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to take reasonable care to obtain what I call the true market value at the date of the sale... |
Having
determined the legal obligation of the first defendant to the plaintiff, I
shall now proceed to discuss whether any duty of care was owed by the second
defendant personally to the plaintiff.
I
do not think that the first defendant can challenge the contention of the
plaintiffs that it is responsible for the acts and/or omissions of the
second defendant in the conduct of this sale based on the principle of
vicarious liability of a master to its servant and / or agent. But the issue
here goes further. The plaintiffs assert that the second defendant is
personally liable to them.
The
authorities of Gran Gelato Ltd v Richcliff (Group) Ltd [1992] 1 All
ER 865 and Al-Kandari v JR Brown & Co [1988] 1 All ER 833,
establish that if a solicitor acting for this client steps outside the role
of its duty as solicitor for his client and accepts a direct responsibility
towards a third party, then the solicitor has created an independent duty of
care to the third party and shall be personally liable to the third party
when he breached such duty of care. What scope this duty involves will
naturally depend on the character of the responsibility which the solicitor
gave to the plaintiff. These propositions I find are rational for adoption
in the application of this case. Thus before I can decide on whether the
second defendant is personally liable to the plaintiffs, each of the alleged
incidents of breach must be examined.
Second
defendant appointed by the court
Before even proceeding to examine each of the alleged incidents of negligence against both the defendants there is a necessity to settle one pertinent issue. This is the contention of the first defendant that the second defendant was not its agent and / or servant in the conduct of this entire sale. The first defendant insists that the second defendant was a servant and / or agent of the court by virtue of the fact that the second defendant was appointed by the SAR to carry out this task; the second defendant has become an officer of the court. Therefore when the second defendant was not its servant and / or agent in the conduct of this sale, the first defendant claims that it should not be made responsible for any negligent act of the second defendant. Riding on this contention, the second defendant argues that if the court does find the second defendant personally liable for negligence, the second defendant cannot be held liable due to s 14(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act which states:
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No officer of any court or other person bound to execute the lawful warrants or orders of any judge or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any civil court for the execution of any warrant or order which he would be bound to execute if within the jurisdiction of the person issuing the same. |
Under
s 256(1) of the NLC, the judicial sale of the said property must be under
the direction of the court. In the execution of this exercise, the NLC
permits the court to appoint a licensed auctioneer to assist in this
assignment. There is however no provision under the NLC for the appointment
of any other person or persons to assist, lest the chargee solicitor, in the
conduct of such sale. I believe the rationale against such appointment must
be to maintain the court's neutrality towards such sale. But unfortunately
in this case, the SAR had proceeded to appoint the second defendant to have
conduct of the sale. Such act of the SAR, in my opinion, is ultra vires,
for the NLC does not prescribe such authority to the SAR to make such
appointment. The SAR had exceeded her jurisdiction. By this, the appointment
of the second defendant to carry out this sale must be null and void and of
no effect. When this is the position, the second defendant cannot be
considered as an officer of the court or other person bound to execute the
order of the court, in order to be entitled for protection under s 14(2) of
the Courts of Judicature Act.
Now
I shall proceed to examine each of the incidents of alleged breach.
Acceptance
of a personal cheque
The
first relates to the acceptance by the second defendant of a personal cheque
from the purchaser for the payment of the 10% deposit. Undoubtedly this was
a breach of Condition 5 of the conditions of sale where it specifies that
such deposit must be made by way of cash or banker's order. This may be
breach of contract, but the question in issue is not related to contract but
in the tort of negligence. A breach of contract may not necessarily amount
to a breach of a duty of care. The duty of care owed by the first defendant,
as expressed earlier, was: to ensure that the true market value of the said
property was obtained at the time of sale. Thus the question that must be
answered is: whether this change in the manner of payment of the 10% deposit
affected the true market value of the property at the material time of sale.
My
view is that it did not. The purchase price was still the same, i.e. it was
the true market value at the material time whether the payment of the 10%
deposit was made in the manner as prescribed in the memorandum of sale or in
the form of a personal cheque of the purchaser. This altered form of payment
made no difference to the true market price of the property at the material
time. By this I find the first defendant has not breached its duty of care
to the plaintiffs in this particular instance.
As
to the question of whether the second defendant is personally liable to the
plaintiffs for this incident, I find no evidence of the second defendant
having acted outside its scope of duty of care to the plaintiffs to
personally assume a duty of care to the plaintiffs. The second defendant is
therefore not liable in this instance to the plaintiffs.
Extension
of time to pay the balance of the purchase price
The
second allegation of breach centres on the two applications to the SAR for
extension of time for the purchaser to pay the balance of the purchase
price.
The completion date, according to the conditions of sale was 90 days from date of sale. This would be June 25, 1989. On June 22,1989, two days before the date set for completion, the second defendant wrote a letter to the SAR, requesting on behalf of the purchaser an extension of a week to complete the purchase due to some delay in the preparation of security documents for a loan which the purchaser intended to obtain to assist him in paying off the balance of the purchase price. The second defendant then expressed that the first defendant who was their client had no objection to this request of the purchaser. Without notifying the plaintiffs of this application the SAR granted this application. She approved this by writing on the side of the paragraph of the letter requesting for extension the word: "OK", and initialled beneath it.
Unable
to meet the dateline of the extended period the second defendant once again
wrote to the SAR on June 30, 1989. The contents of this second letter is
almost similar to the first except that it requested for another week's
extension for the purchaser to complete the sale. Once again the second
defendant said in this letter that the first defendant had no objection.
Again this was approved by the SAR in a similar fashion as the first. This
second application and both approvals by the SAR were not brought to the
attention of the plaintiffs.
Undoubtedly
what was done was totally incorrect. Firstly, this application was not made
in the mode and manner as set out in the Rules of the High Court 1980.
Secondly, the purchaser, not being a party to the foreclosure proceeding,
had not applied to intervene in this proceeding to entitle him locus
to be an applicant in the proceeding. Thirdly, and most fundamentally of
all, the plaintiffs as chargees, were never notified and given an
opportunity to be heard in these applications. They were not even informed
of the approvals granted. They were entirely ignored.
Such
acts of the SAR had been ruled ultra vires - see the
cases of Malayan United Finance Bhd v Liew Yet Lan [1990]
1 MLJ 317, Development Commercial Bank v Kim Ming Choon [1991]
2 MLJ 246 and M&J Frozen Food Sdn Bhd v Siland Sdn Bhd [1994] 1 AMR 137.This entitles the plaintiffs to set
aside the sale of the said property. But the plaintiffs do not wish this.
They prefer to charge the defendants for negligence.
Before
considering the issue of negligence of the defendants, the role of the
second defendant in this incident must be identified and established, i.e.
did the second defendant act independently other than as solicitors for the
first defendant to create a personal duty of care to the plaintiffs? My view
is that it has not. This can be revealed from the second defendant's letters
to the SAR applying for extension of time. Here the second defendant
explicitly announced that it was acting for the first defendant and that,
its client, the first defendant, had no objection to the applications. Such
disclosure is sufficient to warrant my finding of the second defendant to be
a servant and / or agent of the first defendant, and that it had not
personally assumed any independent duty of care to the plaintiffs in this
incident.
As
to the position of the first defendant, I must constantly be reminded that
the scope of its duty of care to the plaintiffs was to secure the true
market value of the said property at the time of sale. Towards this
incident, the same question must be raised. Did the first defendant by its
action in this occasion obtain the true market value of the said property at
the time of sale? Undoubtedly any extension of time to pay the balance of
the purchase price from that originally agreed will have an effect on the
true market value of the property sold. This is for reason that landed
property does not remain static. It fluctuates with time. Thus time of
payment of the purchase price in any landed property is an important factor
in the determination of the purchase price. In this case the true value of
the said property at the time of sale must certainly be affected by the two
extensions of time granted by the SAR. Though the first defendant possessed
no power to approve these extensions but by its acts in consenting to the
applications for extension of time and by not obtaining the prior consent
from the plaintiffs when consenting, it has committed a breach in its duty
of care to the plaintiffs in not securing the true market value of the said
property at the time of sale.
The defendants had raised a contention that since this is a case of negligence the acts of the second defendant, a servant and / or agent of the first defendant, must be judged on the basis of what a reasonably competent solicitor would have done at that material time. As a reminder, a passage from the case of Bell v Strathairn & Blair (1954) 104 LJ 618 was cited. It says:
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In determining whether the solicitor has exercised reasonable skill and care, he should be judged in the light of the circumstances at the time. |
The defendants then called witnesses to testify that it was the practice in lpoh at the material time for solicitors of a chargee to apply for extension of time on behalf of the purchaser to pay the balance of the purchase price in a judicial sale in the manner as was done in this case. Thus, going by the phrase coined by the learned authors of Jackson & Powell on Professional Negligence, 4th Edn at p 450 of:
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His (the defendants) action or advice may, with the benefit of hindsight is no touchstone of negligence. |
The
issue before this court is not on what was the practice of the solicitors at
that material time in carrying out their duties for the clients. It is:
whether the first defendant has breached its duty of care to the plaintiffs
in not obtaining the true market value of the property at the time of sale.
This duty, as I have found by the reasons elaborated above has been breached
in this incident. This contention which relates to the practice in applying
for extension has no relevance to the duty of care to obtain the true market
value of the said property at the time of sale. It might be of good defence
in a suit brought by a chargor against his former solicitor for negligence,
but not in these particular circumstances.
Not
receiving the balance of the purchase price
The
purchase price of the said property in the memorandum of sale was
RM1,020,100. After the fall of the hammer, the purchaser paid 10% of the
purchase price amounting to RM102,010. The balance left was RM918,090. This
was to be paid within 90 days from date of sale. On July 8, 1989, the
purchaser and his financier paid to the second defendant a sum of
RM868,580.90. There was a short fall of RM151,519. This sum was never
received by either defendants. What happened was that the second defendant,
acting for and on behalf of the first defendant, had made a deal with the
purchaser to set-off this sum of RM151,519 from the balance of the purchase
price on the understanding that the purchaser would pay the outstanding quit
rent and assessment then due on the said property which amounted to
RM190,742.16. This arrangement, apparently, was also part of the
consideration for the first defendant to agree to the purchaser's
application to extend the completion date.
This explanation is strongly opposed by the plaintiffs. They claim that under Condition 8 of the condition of sale
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the purchaser shall be liable to pay for the arrears of quit rent and assessment which may be due in respect of the said property. |
So
this sum of RM151,519 should have been collected from the purchaser before
the defendants applied to the SAR for the issuance of the certificate of
sale (Form 16 F) under the NLC. By the defendants' failure to comply with
the above the defendants had committed a breach of its duty of care to them.
The defendants replied by pointing out s 268(1)(a) of the NLC which specifies that:
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The purchase money arising on any sale under this Chapter shall be applied as follows - firstly, in payment of rent to the State Authority ... and other outgoings payable to the State Authority or any local authority; |
By
this, the defendants are of the view that such set-off was justified since
the plaintiffs would still be liable to pay for these outgoings -
ultimately. In addition, the second defendant informs this court that these
outgoings were more than the sum set-off. It was RM190,742.16 and even with
the deduction of RM151,580 the purchaser had to pay out of his own pocket
an additional sum of RM49,500 to the authorities before the registration for
the transfer of the said property could be effected.
In
respect of this episode I find that the second defendant was acting as
solicitor for the first defendant. All sums received and the amount agreed
to be set-off were done with the consent and under the instructions of the
first defendant. Similar to other alleged incidents, I find no evidence to
support the contention that the second defendant had stepped outside the
scope of this duty as solicitor for the first defendant to establish a
direct duty of care with the plaintiffs. The second defendant is therefore
not liable to the plaintiffs.
Though
I may agree that ultimately the plaintiffs would have to pay for such
outgoings but this would only come about after the proceeds of sale was
received. Section 268(1)(a) of the NLC is very specific when it imposes such
obligation to pay. It is only from the proceeds of sale. So unless the
proceeds of sale, which was the full purchase price, was received there was
no duty on the part of the plaintiffs to pay. In this case, the purchaser
had by contract agreed to pay for such outgoings. When this was his
obligation why then should the first defendant compromise with the
purchaser? By such a compromise the true market value of the property at the
time of sale cannot be said to have been secured. The value was reduced by
this deduction. And since this was brought about by the act of the first
defendant, the defendant has breached its duty of care to the plaintiffs.
Whether
damages claim by the plaintiffs can be sustained
In
suit GS 22-58-1992 the plaintiffs had quantified its damages at
RM386,631.80. For suit GS 22-86-1995 there is only a claim for the balance
of the proceeds of sale of the said property and for general damages. Since
there is this difference in the prayers of these two suits I shall have to
deal with them separately.
In
suit GS 22-58-1992, the first item in the particulars of damages is for the
loss of RM102,010. According to the plaintiffs this was caused by the
failure of the first defendant to forfeit the 10% of the deposit paid by the
purchaser.
I
find this claim completely devoid of any merit. The plaintiffs cannot on one
hand accept the agreement of sale of the said property as subsisting and
then simultaneously insist on being paid damages for termination of the
contract due to the purchaser's breach. A claim for this, which is
equivalent to the deposit, can only arise when the agreement for sale is
terminated. But the plaintiffs have no wish for this. They do not want to
set aside the sale. So with this contract of sale subsisting, I cannot find
any justification to award this amount so claimed.
On
similar ground as above, item 2 in the particulars of damage, which is a
claim for loss of interest on the balance of the purchase price of
RM918,090, must also be disallowed.
For
the third item, the loss of sum of RM157,510.41 not collected from the
purchaser and interest accruing thereto, I find for the plaintiffs. This
amount was part of the balance of the purchase price that was unlawfully
set-off. The first defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiffs to secure
the true market value of the property at the date of sale. Since this sum if
paid by purchaser would represent the true market value at the time of sale,
I find that the plaintiffs should be compensated with it.
The
next item in the particulars of damage is the claim for interest charged by
the first defendant on the plaintiffs account for the outstanding sum due on
the judgment debt pronounced in favour of the first defendant in the order
of sale of the said property from the date of the sale to the date of
completion of sale. I find the plaintiffs are not entitled to this. The
order of sale pronounced that the first defendant was entitled to charge
such interest until the full settlement of the judgment sum. When the first
defendant was legally entitled to charge such interest, I cannot comprehend
the logic of why they should be ordered to return this to the plaintiffs.
The
last item in the particulars of damages is for loss of interest suffered by
the plaintiffs in having to pay Public Bank Bhd for facilities given to
another account of the plaintiffs. This claim is far too remote for
consideration and therefore does not justify me in granting.
The
reason why suit GS 22-86-1995 was filed later than GS 22-5 8-1992 had been
explained in the earlier part of this judgment. In respect of this suit no
evidence was led by the plaintiff. I believe that this plaintiff relied his
case solely on the evidence presented in GS 22-58-1992. For this, I am of
the view that the amount of damages to be ordered in this case must be the
plaintiffs' entitlement to the award handed down in the case GS 22-58-1992
since the deceased of the estate was a co-owner of the said property that
was sold by judicial sale. This plaintiff s claim for damages cannot be more
than what the deceased was entitled to from the benefits of the said
property.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
I hereby allow:
Judgment
for the plaintiffs in suit GS 22-58-1992 against the first defendant for
a sum of RM157,510.41 with interest due thereto from July 8, 1989 to
February 29, 1992 at the rate of 11% per annum.
Interest
on the judgment sum at 8% per annum from date of judgment to date of
realisation.
In
suit GS 22-86-1995 the plaintiff shall only be entitled to his share of
the judgment sum and interest as awarded in GS 22-58-1992 according to
the deceased estate entitlement in the said property.
The
claim against the second defendant be dismissed in both the cases with
no order as to costs.
There
shall be costs against the first defendant in both suits.
Cases
Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd
v Development & Realtor Sdn Bhd
[1992] 2 CLJ 1175; Al-Kandari v JR Brown & Co [1988] 1 All ER 833; Cuckmere
Brick Co Ltd v Mutual Finance Ltd [1971] Ch 949; Gran Gelato Ltd v Richcliff
(Group) Ltd [1992] 1 All ER 865; Bell v Strathairn & Blair (1954) 104 LJ 618; Development & Commercial
Bank, Johore Baru v Kim Ming Choon [1991] 2 MLJ 246; M&J Frozen Food Sdn
Bhd v Siland Sdn Bhd [1994] 1 AMR 137; Malayan
United Finance Bhd v Liew Yet Lan [1990] 1 MLJ 317
Legislations
Courts
of Judicature Act 1964: s.14
National
Land Code 1965: s.256(1), s.268(1)(a), Form 16F
Rules
of the High Court 1980
Authors
and other references
Jackson
& Powell, Professional Negligence, 4th Edn
Representation
Lim
Boon Seng (Messrs Lim Boon Seng) for Plaintiff
Chan
Chong Choon & Lim Koon Huan (Skrine & Co) for First Defendant
V
Vijaya Segaran, James Devadson & Lau Peng Cheng (Maxwell, Kenion, Cowdy &
Jones) for Second Defendant
Notes:-
This decision is also reported at [2000] 3 AMR 2969
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