Jaya Harta Realty Sdn Bhd

- vs -

Koperasi Kemajuan Pekerja-pekerja Ladang Bhd

Judgment

Vincent KK Ng, J

1. Before me is an application (vide Encl 98) by the plaintiff company (plaintiffs), under Order 45 r 11 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (the Rules), to stay an order granted by my predecessor on April 28, 1999 setting aside a garnishment order made by the learned Senior Assistant Registrar, garnishing the sum of RM842,037.24 held by the respondent / garnishee (garnishees), a legal firm practicing under the name and style of Messrs Isharidah, Ho, Chong & Menon. The April 28, 1999 order also ordered the plaintiffs to return the garnished funds to the garnishees. The plaintiffs' application for garnishment was grounded upon a regularly obtained judgment debt against the defendant company / judgment debtor (defendants).

2. The events leading to the application are as follows. The plaintiffs had been engaged by the defendants to do some work on the defendants' land, identified as Lot 2790, Mk Sungai Petani, Daerah Kuala Muda, held under Geran No 64729 (the 'said land'). After completing the contracted work, the plaintiffs sought payment of RM665,851.20. The defendants, however, informed the plaintiffs that they were for the time being, unable to pay due to shortage of funds. At the same time the defendants requested for further time as they were in the midst of negotiating a sale of the said land to a company known as Syarikat Skyline View Sdn Bhd ('Sykt Skyline View'). And, in the event that the deal was successful, the land would be sold at RM4 million, and payment to the plaintiffs could then be effected.

3. Despite this assurance no payment was received. Thus, the plaintiffs instituted the present suit and proceeded to sign judgment-in-default against the defendants on April 18, 1995. The plaintiffs having knowledge of the purported sale of the land to Sykt Skyline View also became aware of the fact that the garnishees had been appointed by Sykt Skyline View as solicitors in the sale and purchase transaction. As solicitors, they were also acting as stakeholders of the sale price. Thus, to reap the fruits of its final judgment the plaintiffs took out garnishment proceedings under Order 49 of the Rules against the garnishees. The learned Senior Assistant Registrar allowed the plaintiffs' application, resulting in the garnishees filing an application (vide Encl 27), inter alia, to stay the execution proceedings of the garnishment order dated January 27, 1997 and also to set aside the garnishment order dated January 27, 1997.

4. This application by the garnishee was dismissed by the Senior Assistant Registrar after he heard the submissions. The garnishees then appealed (vide Encl 61) to the Judge-in-chambers against the Senior Assistant Registrar's order of dismissal. On April 28, 1999, the learned Judge allowed the appeal. The garnishment order was set aside and the plaintiffs were ordered to return the garnished money to the garnishees on or before May 12, 1999 with interest. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal against this order of April 28, 1999 vide Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No K-02-335-99. At the same time the plaintiffs filed the present application before me (Encl 98) to stay the execution of the Judge's said order pending the disposal of their appeal to the Court of Appeal.

5. At the hearing of Encl 98, the parties were on common ground that the court has unfettered discretion to grant a stay of execution, but the court's powers should only be exercised when there exist special circumstances, as an appeal does not operate as a stay. Though, I must observe that initially the plaintiffs' counsel conveyed the impression that he was labouring under some confusion, when in his written submission he said:

   In Malaysia there are two (2) principles formulated by the courts on the stay principle namely: that there must be 'special circumstances' shown; and, on the 'nugatory' principle. Both these principles stands as the law today.

6. In order to demonstrate the existence of special circumstances the plaintiffs contended that besides having an arguable appeal and the balance of convenience in their favour, if the order is not stayed and the money returned to the garnishees, who in turn may release the money to either the defendants or Sykt Skyline View (if so instructed), there will be no funds available to satisfy the judgment that they had obtained against the defendants, should the plaintiffs succeed in their said appeal against the learned Judge's order of April 28.

7. This case affords this court an opportunity to attempt to unravel the apparent conflict between on the one hand, the principles for stay of execution of judgment pending appeal, adopted and applied in Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v Ang Keng [1953] 19 MLJ 116, and entrenched in the Federal Court in Kerajaan Malaysia v Jasanusa Sdn Bhd [1995] 2 AMR 1477 and Kerajaan Malaysia v Dato Hj Ghani Gilong [1995] 2 AMR 1465 (where in all three cases stay of execution of judgment was granted), and on the other hand, the principles for stay of proceedings pending appeal propounded by the Court of Appeal in See Teow Guan v Kian Joo Holdings Sdn Bhd [1996] 3 AMR 3733 (where stay of proceedings was refused, but it went on to declare the judgment of Brown J in Serangoon Garden on stay of execution to be: 'bad law, and ought no longer to be followed by this court'). 

8. On the topic under discussion it may perhaps be of assistance to take excerpts from paragraph 455 (at p 272) of the Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol 17 (4th Edn) which reads:

   The court has an absolute and unfettered discretion as to the granting or refusing of a stay, and as to the terms upon which it will grant it, and will, as a rule, only grant a stay if there are special circumstances, which must be deposed to on affidavit unless the application is made at the hearing.

   And, on the distinction between stay of execution of a final judgment or order and stay of proceedings, it may also be pertinent to set out paragraph 451 (at p 269) of the same volume in Halsbury's, which states:

   The court's power to stay proceedings should not be confused with its power to stay the execution of a final judgment or order. The court has an inherent jurisdiction to control its own proceedings so as to prevent an abuse of process, and accordingly to stay proceedings which are frivolous, vexatious or harassing, or which are manifestly groundless or in which there is clearly no cause of action in law or equity, or where the justice of the case so requires. The court does not, however, have an inherent jurisdiction over all judgments or orders which it has made under which it can stay execution in all cases. On the contrary, the court's inherent jurisdiction to stay the execution of a judgment or order is limited in its extent, and can only be exercised on grounds that are relevant to a stay of the enforcement proceedings themselves, and not to matters which may operate as a defence in law or relief in equity, for such matters must be specifically raised by way of defence in the action itself.

9. A further distinction to note is that in stay of proceedings cases the court's inherent jurisdiction is invoked, whereas applications for stay of execution of judgment are, in our High Courts, governed by a specific provision, being Order 45 r 11 of the Rules. Order 45 r 11 provides that:

   Without prejudice to Order 27 r 1, a party against whom a judgment has been given or an order made may apply to the Court for a stay of execution of the judgment or order or other relief on the ground of matters which have occurred since the date of the judgment or order, and the Court may by order grant such relief and on such terms, as it thinks fit. [emphasis added]

10. Besides the above cases there is a welter of case authorities and judicial pronouncements on the question of stay of execution of judgment pending appeal here and from Commonwealth jurisdictions spanning a period of well over a century from the English case of Wilson v Church (No 2) [1879] 12 Ch D 454 until present day. An attempt at distillation of the law on this topic would not be possible without also reading the discussions on the issues and the principles expounded and applied in those cases.[a]

11. The terms in which the court's jurisdiction is conferred on stay of execution pending an appeal are general and unlimited. How the judicial discretion conferred by that jurisdiction should be exercised must be guided by proper rules founded on principle.

12. The justice of the case on stay is arrived at by striking a judicious and equitable balance between the principle that the successful party in the litigation ought to be allowed to reap the fruits of that litigation and not obtain a mere barren success, and the countervailing principle that should the unsuccessful party in litigation be ultimately successful in his appeal, he ought not be deprived of the fruits of his litigation due to the result of his appeal being rendered nugatory. Yet, it must always be borne in mind that the successful party in litigation has acquired a vested interest in the outcome of his case whereas the other party who appeals only has an interest contingent upon a successful outcome on his appeal - obviously, one has to be mindful that such considerations pertaining to the compelling concept of 'fruits of litigation' is wholly irrelevant to stay of proceedings applications.

13. And, it is primarily for this latter reason and the implied caveat that courts should discourage parties who lose their cases upon merits, from wrenching the fruits of litigation from the successful parties - by keeping the litigation alive through spurious appeals without any real prospect of success and simply in a hope of gaining respite against immediate execution upon the judgment - that the courts have been and are only moved to grant such stay upon a set of certain requirements which, for want of a more appropriate term, the courts have been driven to use, quite rightly, the expression 'special circumstances.' Thus, 'special circumstances' does not mean very special or exceptional or peculiar circumstances but is a term to denote a combination of certain determining factors that are demonstrated by affidavit evidence to persuade the court that it is a just and appropriate case to grant a stay of execution in the circumstances. In other words the term 'special circumstances' for purposes of stay proceedings does not bear precisely the same meaning ascribed to it in Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86.

14. In order not to impose a fetter on the exercise of the courts discretion whether to grant a stay of execution, myriad and various factors constituting special circumstances have been recognised by the courts in Commonwealth jurisdictions, and "how pertinent that factor would be may vary according to the circumstances of each particular case" per Abdul Hamid J (as he then was) in Mohd Mustafa v Kandasami (No 2) [1979] 2 MLJ 126 FC. I would therefore wholly and readily agree with the lucid views - expressed in potent language – of lan HC Chin, JC (as he then was) in Govt of M'sia v Datuk Haji Kadir Mohd Mastan [1993] 2 AMR 2095 who had this to say -

    I am of the opinion that the list of factors constituting special circumstances is infinite and could grow with time. Any attempt to limit the list or close a category would be to impose a fetter on the exercise of the discretion of the court whether to grant or stay an execution; making the discretion less of a discretion. This is surely not what discretion is all about. As long as one does not stray beyond the perimeter set by the judicial principles, the discretion can be exercised.

15. It follows that these are not matters of rigid principle and an applicant for stay has to demonstrate - not by mere speculation or argument - an appropriate case to bring it within the term ' special circumstances', failing which weight must be given to the fact that the judgment has been in favour of the other party who is entitled to the fruits of his litigation – a fortiori a judgment entered after a full trial of the issues (or in the case of an appeal, after a full hearing thereof) [See Griffith v Benn 27 TLR 346, 350; Hong Leong Finance v Hon Hoi Weng (supra). Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd [1976] 1 MLJ 131; and Syarikat Berpakat v Lim Kai Kok (supra)].

16. In Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (supra), although Kirby P, when delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales, had frowned upon the use of the expression 'special or exceptional circumstances' in preference to 'an appropriate case', he nevertheless quite correctly (in my view) set out the following three essential ingredients (the traditional core ingredients) that are necessary to demonstrate 'an appropriate' case to warrant the exercise of discretion in favour of a stay, namely:

    1. where "the balance of convenience" is in favour of the applicant / appellant [see also A-G v Emerson (supra), Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (supra)], and such balance of convenience may sometimes be maintained by the stay being made subject to certain conditions imposed by the court [as per provision '... may order on such terms as it thinks fit', in Order 45 r 11 of the RHC., and also see Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (supra)],

    2. where "it is apparent that unless a stay is granted an appeal will be rendered nugatory..." [see also Wilson v Church (No 2) (supra) and Scarborough v Lew's Junction Stores Pty Ltd (supra), and

    3. that the applicant / appellant "has an arguable" appeal.

17. In my view, shorn of its contending terminology, the courts here and in the Commonwealth jurisdictions have in essence traditionally adopted as its core ingredients the above three generic ingredients for granting stay, with some variations where appropriate depending on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. One may term it 'special circumstances' or 'appropriate case' yet the basic ingredients for granting stay bears insignificant variation from the said three traditional core ingredients.

18. The 'nugatory' ingredient is not an exclusive or singular but an essential condition precedent, which, if not made out to the satisfaction of the court, a stay ought not be granted, whatever the merits of the appeal and the balance of convenience. And, for starkly obvious reasons, any one of the aforesaid three traditional core ingredients would not suffice to tilt the balance in favour of a stay. That this is so is, in our own jurisdiction, confirmed by the Federal Court in Mohamed Mustafa v Kandasami (No 2) which, rightly and quite clearly, abided by the then established traditional principles, when, on the question of stay of execution, it intoned:

    One of the determining factors that calls for consideration is whether by not making an order to stay the execution it would make the appeal if successful, nugatory in that it would deprive an appellant of the results of the appeal. [emphasis added]

19. As the phrase used was 'one of the determining factors' I would be misreading the gist or tenor of that decision to hold or to imply that the 'nugatory' factor was the sole or novel ingredient considered by that court or that, a fresh approach had been advanced or postulated therein.

20. Indeed, after a careful reading of See Teow Guan (supra), I find that therein the Court of Appeal had, quite rightly, adopted the three traditional core ingredients as its guideline principles when rejecting that application for a stay of the proceedings. Thus, on the ingredient 'balance of convenience' the appellate court was of the view that:

    This is not a case where there will be a bitter opposition to the winding up of the first respondent. To delay the hearing and disposal of such a case as this will, in my judgment, cause a manifest injustice to the parties. It will also put the list of the commercial court in hopeless disorder.

    And, enlarging on the same point, it observed that:

    As against all this is to be weighed the consequences of granting a stay in this case. There is no doubt that the effect of such an order would be to prolong the disposal of what in essence is a simple matter. There will be a delay of several months while awaiting the hearing of an appeal that is bound to fail. Ultimately, after the passage of many wasted months, the petition will be heard unopposed and the first respondent will be wound up. When viewed in this way, it is not difficult to see where the justice of the case lies.

    The appellate court also found against the nugatory factor when it observed that:

    The appellants will not suffer any prejudice. They want the first respondent to be wound up. The other respondents are agreeable to that course. So they will get their primary relief. They want the assets of the first respondent company to be distributed in specie. That, as I have said, is a matter over which the High Court has no jurisdiction at the hearing of the appellants' petition. But the appellants have, as I earlier observed, the right to raise this with the liquidator. He may or may not agree with the request. Either way, the party who is dissatisfied with the decision of the liquidator is entitled to raise the matter on a summons taken out before a Judge of the High Court.

    And lastly, on merits of the appeal, it held:

    Take this very case. It is clear from the authorities that the substantive appeal, based upon a single point of interpretation, lacks all merit and is doomed to failure.

21. Therefore, it is not surprising that the views expressed in See Teow Guan (supra) was not heeded in a very recent decision of the same court (different panel) in Tropiland Sdn Bhd v DCB Bank Bhd [2000] 1 AMR766. In Tropiland, when dismissing the application for stay of the High Court's writ of possession pending disposal of the applicant's appeal, it held:

    We also found that the plaintiff has not shown any special circumstances for a stay to be ordered. We were fortified in our decision by the Federal Court case of Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd, Ling Beng Sung v Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd (No2) [1976] 1 MLJ 131 which refused the application for stay as no special circumstances were shown to support the application for stay.

22. Having appraised myself of the established and entrenched legal principles, I will now apply them to the facts and consider whether in the case at hand, the plaintiffs had made out a case of special circumstances in terms as discussed above to justify granting a stay of execution.

23. I would wholly agree with Mr Ram Kumar's (the learned counsel for the plaintiffs) contention that if the stay is not granted the plaintiffs' appeal, even if successful, would be rendered nugatory. This is because the proceeds of the garnishment is the only source of satisfying the judgment debt. The said transfer of the said land (Geran No 64729) was registered in the Registry of Titles on December 1, 1994. In the event that the stay is not granted there is every likelihood that the garnishees, upon receiving the return of the garnished sum, may release the proceeds of sale of the said land to the judgment debtor or to Sykt Skyline View - the garnishees being duty bound to act according to instructions. Indeed, the garnishees themselves had, by letter to the plaintiffs' then solicitors dated May 12, 1995 (Exh 'PM-2' of Encl 107) acknowledged that:

    The Koperasi (defendants) had in their suit (Civil Suit No 22-22-95) claimed for the return of the land which they alleged was fraudulently transferred to our clients;

    and further added that:

    In the light of His Lordship's decision, it cannot be gainsaid that the balance purchase price held by us has crystalized into a debt due to the Koperasi. [emphasis added]

24. Furthermore, on the other hand, it was also contended that, should the garnished amount be released to Sykt Skyline for whatever reason, there was every possibility that the proceeds will be dissipated and utilised, and the plaintiffs will be deprived of the money, as a search conducted on the instructions of the plaintiffs had revealed that the garnished proceeds were Sykt Skyline View's only assets. Thus, in support of Encl 98, the plaintiffs also appended a financial statement showing the financial status of Sykt Skyline View (Exh 'GY-XVJ' to Encl 99). It appears as follows:

    PEJABAT PENDAFTAR SYARIKAT KEMENTERIAN PERDAGANGAN DALAM NEGERI DAN HAL EHWAL PENGGUNA, TINGKAT 11 -17, PUTRA PLACE, 100 JALAN PUTRA,                 50622 KUALA LUMPUR  Talipon :  03-4433366 Fax     :   03-4437505 MAKLUMAT SYARIKAT Nama syarikat : SKYLINE VIEW SDN BHD No. syarikat    : 211986-A Tarikh penubuhan : 30-JAN-91 Taraf                  : SENDIRIAN Jenis                     : BERHAD DENGAN SAHAM Alamat Daftar         : LOT907, TKT.9 WISMA HLA  JALAN RAJA CHULAN,  KUALA LUMPUR Poskod              : 50200 Alamat Perniagaan     : NO:17, JLN.SEMANGAT,  PETALING JAYA Poskod              : 46200 Jenis Perniagaan       : INVESTMENT HOLDING MAKLUMAT MODAL JUMLAH (RM) BIASA PREFERENCE LAIN- LAIN DIBENARKAN 25000 Jumlah Syer             25000 0 0 Dibahagikan kepada 25000 0 0 Amaun nominal sesyen (dalam sen) 100 0 0 DITERBITKAN 1002 Tunai 1002 0 0 Selain dari tunai 0 0 0

25. Most importantly, it has to be noted that the garnishees had made no assertion that the said sum was not to be released, nor had they undertaken not to release the money to the defendants or to Sykt Skyline View in the event that same is returned to it pursuant to the order of April 28. The garnishees, being a legal firm whose duty is to release the money held by them - according to instructions -to whichever party is entitled to it, it is highly probable, judging from the evidence made available to this court, that in the event that the garnishees release the money to the defendants or to Sykt Skyline View, the outcome of the plaintiffs' appeal if successful, would be nugatory. Furthermore, it was not disputed that the defendants do not have any substantial funds to satisfy the judgment debt due to the plaintiffs.

26. The above adumbrated considerations (reiterated here in part), and the circumstances of this case clearly points to a balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs, and such balance could also be maintained through the stay being granted subject to certain terms imposed by this court.

27. As to whether the plaintiffs' pending appeal is "obviously unarguable" or not, I am of the view that it is clearly arguable as the garnishees appear to be, at all times, aware of the garnishment proceedings. And, the onus is upon them to explain their non-appearance in court on various dates at the hearing of the garnishment order to show cause (Encl 8 dated April 18, 1995) served on the garnishees under cover of a letter dated May 6, 1995 (Encl 11) from the plaintiffs' then solicitors.

28. Enclosure 8 was Fixed for hearing on February 6, 1996, April 9, 1996, June 11, 1996, September 3, 1996 while the garnishment order was only made absolute on January 21, 1997. Indeed, regrettably, the court records disclose gross indifference on the part of the garnishees, which led to the garnishment order being made absolute by the learned Senior Assistant Registrar. Furthermore, there is also total failure on the part of the garnishees to file any affidavit of objection promptly or any time after service of the application for garnishment order until it was made absolute. It is also pertinent to note that the order originally obtained by the plaintiffs from the Senior Assistant Registrar was a final garnishment order made absolute, which was grounded upon a legally and regularly obtained judgment debt due and outstanding from the defendants.

29. Accordingly, I allowed the application for stay, but subject to certain terms - consistent with Order 45 r 11 of the Rules - in order to better maintain the balance of convenience, and I made the following orders:

    1. The amount RM842,037.24 be deposited within one month from the date of this order in a reputable bank in an interest bearing fixed deposit account on six monthly basis in the clients' account of the plaintiffs' solicitors, M/s Morgan & Co, of lpoh.

    2. The original of the fixed deposit receipt to be forwarded to this court within one week of the deposit of the amount and a copy thereof to be extended to the garnishee.

    3. The said amount deposited to remain deposited in the said clients' account of M/s Morgan & Co, until the disposal of the appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision of Yang Arif Dato' Mohd Hishamudin dated April 28, 1999.

    4. The solicitors M/s Morgan & Co, are to carry into effect (a) and (d) above within the stipulated period  (as undertaken), failing which the garnishees are entitled to enforce the order dated April 28, 1999.

    5. Costs in the cause.

Cases

Govt of M'sia v Datuk Haji Kadir Mohd Mastan [1993] 2 AMR 2095; Mohamed Mustafa v Kandasami (No.2) [1979] 2 MLJ 126; A-G v Emerson [1889] 24 QBD 56; Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1985) 10 ACLR 42; All Persons in the house etc in Johor v Punca Klasik Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 AMR 1855; Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 184; Annot Lyle, The (1886) 11 PD 114; Atkins v GW Ry [1886] 2 TLR 400; Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd v Majlis Amanah Ra'ayat [1979] 1 MLJ 23; Barker v Lavery [1885] 14 QBD 769; Brook v Emerson [1906] 95 LT 821; Calicut Bank Ltd, Re (1938) 8 Comp Cas 313; Che Wan Development Sdn Bhd v Co-operative Central Bank Bhd [1989] 3 MLJ 40; Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1982) 56 ALJR 857; Dickson Trading (S) Pte Ltd v Transmarco Ltd [1989] 2 MLJ 408; Erinford Prop Ltd v Cheshire County Council [1974] Ch 261; Gentali (M) Sdn Bhd v Kawasaki Sunrock Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 AMR 951; Griffith v Benn 27 TLR 346; Hong Leong Finance Bhd v Hon Hoi Weng [1987] 2 MLJ 377; Kerajaan Malaysia v Dato Hj Ghani Gilong [1995] 2 AMR 1465; Kerajaan Malaysia v Jasanusa Sdn Bhd [1995] 2 AMR 1477; Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd, Re; Ling Beng Sung v Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd (No 2) [1976] 1 MLJ 131; Lee Kuan Yew v Jeyaretnam JB [1991] 1 MLJ 83; Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86; London Permanent Benefit Building Society v De Beer [1969] 1 Ch 321; Marine & General Mutual Life Assurance Society v Feltwell Fen Second District Drainage Board [1945] KB 394; McPhail v Persons, Names Unknown [1973] Ch 447; Middle Harbour Investments Ltd, Re (In liquidation) (Court of Appeal, December 15, 1976) (unreported); Monk v Bartram [1981] 1 QB 346 CA; Scarborough v Lew's Function Stores Pty Ltd (193) VR 129; See Teow Guan v Kian Joo Holdings Sdn Bhd [1996] 3 AMR 3733; Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v Ang Keng [1953] 19 MLJ 116; Syarikat Berpakat v Lim Kai Kok [1983] 1 MLJ 406; TC Trustees Ltd v FS Darwen (Successors) [1969] 2 QB 295; Tang Chok Ching v Wong lk Tieng [1973] 2 MLJ 25; Toh Kheng Heng v Ahmad Fauzi Mohd Taufek [1994] 1 MLJ 356; Tropiland Sdn Bhd v DCB Bank Bhd [2000] 1 AMR 766; Whu Shu Chen (sole executrix of the estate of Goh Keng How, deceased) v Raja Zainal Abidin Raja Hussin [1995] 3 AMR 2313; Wilson v Church (No 2) (1879) 12 Ch D 454.

Legislations

Rules of the High Court 1980: Ord.45 r 11, Ord.49

Authors and other references

Halsbury 's Laws of England, Vol 17, 4th Edn

Representation

Ram Kumar (Morgan & Co) for Appellants / Plaintiffs

Steven Puung (Isharidah, Ho, Chong & Menon) for Respondent / Garnishee

Notes:-

[a] Wilson v Church (No 2) [1879] 12 ChD 454, Barker v Lavery [1885] 14 QBD 769, Atkins v GW Ry [1886] 2 TLR 400; The Annot Lyle [1886] 11 PD 114; A-G v Emerson [1889] 24 QBD 56; Brook v Emerson [1906] 95 LT 821; Calicut Bank Ltd, Re (1938) 8 Comp Cas 313; Marine & General Mutual Life Assurance Society v Feltwell Fen Second District Drainage Board [1945] KB 394; Scarborough v Lew's Function Stores Pty Ltd (193) VR 129 at p 130; TC Trustees Ltd v FS Darwen (Successors) [1969] 2 QB 295; London Permanent Benefit Building Society v De Beer [1969] 1 Ch 321, Tang Chok Ching v Wong lk Tieng [1973] 2 MLJ 25, McPhail v Persons, Names Unknown [1973] Ch 447; Erinford Prop Ltd v Cheshire County Council [1974] Ch 261; Re Middle Harbour Investments Ltd (In liquidation) (Court of Appeal, December 15, 1976) (unreported), Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd; Ling Beng Sung v Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd (No 2) [1976] 1 MLJ 131; Mohamed Mustofa v Kandasami (No 2) [1979] 2 MLJ 126; Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd v Majlis Amanah Ra'ayat [1979] 1 MLJ 3; Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons [1979] 2 NSMLR 184; Monk v Bartram [1981] 1 QB 346 CA; Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1982) 56 ALJR 857; Syarikat Berpakat v Lim Kai Kok [1983] 1 MLJ 406; Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1985) 10 ACLR 42; Dickson Trading (S) Pte Ltd v Transmarco Ltd [1989]  2MLJ 408; Che Wan Development Sdn Bhd v Co-operative Central Bank Bhd [1989] 3 MLJ 40; Lee Kuan Yew v Jeyaretnam JB [1991] 1 MLJ 83; Hong Leong Finance Bhd v Hon Hoi Weng [1987] 2 MLJ 377; Toh Kheng Heng v Ahmad Fauzi Mohd Taufek [1994] 1 MLJ 356; Whu Shu Chen (sole executrix of the estate of Goh Keng How, deceased) v Raja Zainal Aidin Raja Hussin [1995] 3 AMR 2313; Gentali (M) Sdn Bhd v Kawasaki Sunrock Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 AMR 951; All Persons in the house etc in Johor v Punca Klasik Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 AMR 1855.

This decision is also reported at [2000] 3 AMR 3693