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www.ipsofactoJ.com/international/index.htm [2003] Part 1 Case 2 [CAEW] |
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COURT OF APPEAL, ENGLAND & WALES |
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Asahi Medical Co Ltd - vs - Macopharma (UK) Ltd |
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LORD JUSTICE ALDOUS LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY LORD JUSTICE JONATHAN PARKER |
16 APRIL 2002 |
Judgment
Lord Justice Aldous
Asahi Medical Co Ltd, the patentees of European Patent (UK) 0349188, appeal against the decision of Laddie J of 5th December 2000 which held the patent invalid as it was obvious. Macopharma (UK) Ltd and Macopharma SA, the defendants, support the conclusion of the judge.
The patent has the priority date of 26th June 1988. It is for a “Method for separating blood into blood components and blood components separator unit.”
The background to the invention was fully explained at trial and I gratefully adopt the judge’s explanation of it which was accepted to be accurate, save that Asahi submitted that it omitted certain beliefs and attitudes that prevailed at the priority date. I will deal with that submission later in this judgment.
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Background (i) Blood and its components
(ii) Transfusion of blood and its components
(ii) Methods of separating blood into its components
(iii) Storage of blood components - open and closed systems
(iv) Problems with the transfusion of blood or components containing leucocytes.
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THE PATENT
The field of the invention is stated in this way:
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The present invention relates to a method for separating blood into blood components aseptically in a closed system which is useful for separately collecting leukocyte-removed blood components, particularly leukocyte-removed erythrocytes, leukocyte-removed plasma, leukocyte-removed platelets etc from the whole blood of a healthy human. The present invention is also concerned with a blood components separator unit, which can advantageously be used in practice of the above-mentioned method. |
The specification explains the need for removal of leukocytes from whole blood. It states that in recent years various filter means have been developed for effectively removing leukocytes and that generally, when practising removal, the filter means is connected to a bag containing whole blood or blood components. This, it is said, is difficult to do aseptically and therefore the blood products need to be used within 24 hours.
The specification refers next to US patent No. 4,596,657 which is said to disclose a system having a primary bag connected to at least two satellite bags. The filter means is connected between the primary bag and the first satellite bag. In use the blood is centrifuged in the primary bag. The erythrocyte concentrate is passed to the second satellite bag via the filter. The stated disadvantages are that the leukocytes in the plasma are not removed and the centrifugal force can destroy the effectiveness of the filter.
After reference to European Patent Application No. 0266683 and WO 84/00892, the invention is summarised in this way.
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The present inventors have made extensive and intensive studies with a view toward developing a method and a unit for separating blood into blood components aseptically, which are free from the above-mentioned drawbacks. As a result, it has been found that when whole blood is first filtered by filter means for removing leukocytes to collect the leukocyte-removed blood in a primary bag and the primary bag is then aseptically disconnected from the filter means and subjected to centrifugation. Blood components, such as plasma, erythrocytes and platelets in leukocytes-free form can be aseptically and readily obtained without the danger of damage to the filter means and the primary bag. Based on the above-mentioned finding, the present invention has been completed. |
The core teaching of the patent was accurately described by the judge as follows:
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21. |
The patent is quite a lengthy document. However its core teaching is simple to understand. It can be explained by reference to its first drawing which is set out below:
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22. |
In this arrangement all the connections are by cuttable and sealable tubing. In other words it is a closed system. Blood is collected directly from the donor into the collector bag (1). It is then passed through a filter (2). The filter can either be a filter which filters out leucocytes only or one which filters out leucocytes and platelets. The leucodepleted blood then passes into primary bag (3) which is described in the specification as the primary bag. The connection to the filter (2) can then be sealed and aseptically separated. The remaining bags are centrifuged so that the contents of primary bag (3) are separated into discrete fractions. The top fraction can then be passed to satellite bag (4). Again the interconnecting tube (10) can then be sealed and aseptically severed. The result will be that the leucodepleted blood will be separated into two components retained separately in bags (3) and (4). If the filter is one which filters out both platelets and leucocytes, then what is left after the filter (2) consists only of plasma and erythrocytes. After centrifugation, bag (3) will contain RCC and bag (4) will contain plasma. Because they have been made in a closed system, they can be stored. |
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23. |
If the filter (2) only removes leucocytes, then what passes into satellite bag (3) consists of red cells, platelets and plasma. This can be split into its three components by a double centrifugation step. This is illustrated by another drawing in the patent set out below:
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24. |
In this case the leucodepleted blood in main bag (3) can be centrifuged a first time to split it into two components: RCC and a mixture of plasma and platelets. The latter can then be passed to satellite bag (4) where there is a second centrifugation. This splits the contents of the bag into two components: a platelet concentrate and plasma. These can then be separated. For example the plasma can be decanted into satellite bag (5). This arrangement can be re-drawn in the style of figure 1 above:
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25. |
These figures illustrate essential features of the invention, namely (a) that the method involves filtering the whole blood before it undergoes further separation by centrifugation and (b) the whole method is carried out in a closed system. These features are central to the claims still in issue. |
The patent contains 14 claims. Only 3 are relevant. They are in this form:
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Claim 1: |
A method for separating blood into blood components, comprising the steps of;
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Claim 4: |
The method according to claim 1, wherein in step (c) the whole blood is passed through said filter means (2) for removing leukocytes and platelets, and in step (g), the filtered blood is separated into the erythrocytes and the plasma. |
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Claim 8: |
A blood components separator unit comprising: means for collecting blood (1); filter means (2) for removing leukocytes or removing leukocytes and platelets, said filter means (2) having a filtrate outlet (23); first conduit means (8) for connecting the means for collecting blood (1) to the filter means; a primary bag (3); second conduit means (9) for connecting the filtrate outlet (23) of said filter means (2) to said primary bag (3), said second conduit means being sealable and cuttable; a satellite bag system; and additional conduit means (10, 11) for connecting the satellite bag system to said primary bag (3), the additional conduit means (10) being sealable and cuttable, wherein said first conduit means (8) is fixedly connected at both ends thereof to said means for collecting blood (1) and said filter means (2), respectively; said second conduit means (9) is fixedly connected at both ends thereof to said filtrate outlet (23) and said primary bag (3), respectively; and said additional conduit means (10, 11) is fixedly connected at both ends thereof to said primary bag (3) and said satellite bag system, respectively, so that a substantially closed system of the blood components separator unit is provided, thereby enabling whole blood to be aseptically separated into leukocyte-containing blood components and leukocyte-free blood components. |
THE APPEAL
As the appeal is against the judge’s conclusion that the patent was obvious, Asahi accepted that this Court would be cautious before reversing that conclusion (see Biogen Inc. v Medeva Plc [1997] RPC 1 at 45). Mr. Thorley QC, counsel for Asahi, submitted that did not provide any difficulty to his clients’ case as the judge had gone wrong both in principle and approach. He collected his submissions under four heads.
First, that the judge had improperly construed claim 1.
Second, that the judge had failed to construe or to take account of claim 4.
Third, the judge had erred in his approach.
Fourth the judge should have considered whether the skilled man “would” have implemented the teaching in the prior art relied on.
Construction
Asahi submitted that the judge had misunderstood the ambit of claim 1 and had failed to consider claim 4. They submitted that claim 1 was a claim to a method for separating blood into blood components. As such it was a method for producing at least two useful separated blood products. It should be read as if the words “and therefore separated into blood components” was added at the end of the claim. Alternatively if claim 1 stopped short of requiring separation into useful products, then that was specifically claimed in claim 4. In support of those submissions we were referred to the opening words of the claim and to passages in the specification and in particular the introduction at page 2 lines 7 to 11, the summary of the invention, the discussion of step (g) of claim 1 appearing at page 7 lines 1 to 31.
I disagree. Claim 1 stops at the centrifugation step. There is no requirement that a centrifuged product or products is expressed into a satellite bag. That is consistent with the description of step (g) at page 7 lines 1 to 12 of the specification. There follows the statement that “after centrifugation the plasma in the upper layer is transferred into satellite bag 4 which is fluid tightly connected to primary bag 3 …”. That is emphasised on page 9 at line 18 of the specification where a preferred mode for “separating whole blood into three component layers” is described. That involves centrifugation and “following step (g), two of the layers are individually separated from the remainder to obtain the separated erythrocyte layer”.
The conclusion that claim 1 monopolises a method which stops at the centrifugation stage is emphasised by the last words of claim 8. That claim is to an apparatus which provides a blood components separator which is a closed system: “thereby enabling whole blood to be aseptically separated into leukocyte-containing blood components and leukocyte-free blood components.” Thus the contents of the filter are described as blood components but it has not been suggested that the leukocyte-containing blood components which remain in the filter are useful blood componetns. Claim 1 uses the expression “blood components” in the same way.
Claim 4 has to be read with claim 2. Claim 2 requires, in step (c), the whole blood to be passed through the filter and “in step (g), the filtered blood is separated into an erythrocytes layer and a mixture layer of the plasma and the platelets, and following step (g), said mixture is subjected to centrifugation to separate said mixture layer with a plasma layer and a platelets layer.” Claim 4 is concerned with step (g). It specifies that the centrifugation of that step separates the filtered blood into the erythrocytes and the plasma. Thus read with claims 1 and 2 it is clear that it is concerned with production of layers by centrifugation. The judge was correct when he said in paragraphs 29 and 30:
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... There is no requirement that the blood be separated into multiple components. It is enough, for example, that the method and apparatus can produce RCC. What is at the heart of the invention is the idea of passing whole blood through a filter in a closed system. As Dr. Pamphilon accepted, everything that happens after the filtration step is absolutely standard blood processing. |
Obviousness
As I have said the sole attack on validity was that the patent was not a patentable invention (see sections 72 (1)(a) of the Patent Act 1977). The ground relied on was that it did not involve an inventive step (section 1(1)(b) of the 1997 Act). As section 3, states the invention is to be taken to involve an inventive step “if it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art, having regard to any matter which forms part of the state of the art.”
I will come later in this judgment to consider the documents relied on as constituting the state of the art, but must first consider the submission made by Mr. Thorley that the judge’s approach was wrong in principle.
The judge used the structured approach suggested by Oliver LJ who gave the judgment of the court in Windsurfing International Inc v Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] RPC 59 at page 73:
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154. |
There are, we think, four steps which require to be taken in answering the jury question. The first is to identify the inventive concept embodied in the patent in suit. Thereafter, the court has to assume the mantle of the normally skilled but unimaginative addressee in the art at the priority date and to impute to him what was, at that date, common general knowledge in the art in question. The third step is to identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as [forming part of the state of the art] and the alleged invention. Finally, the court has to ask itself whether, viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention, those differences constitute steps which would have been obvious to the skilled man or whether they require any degree of invention |
When considering the attack on the patent based on an article referred to as Frey-Wettstein, the judge started to consider the fourth step of Windsurfing at paragraph 41 of his judgment. His ultimate conclusion was as follows:
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45. |
In my view, none of this undermines Macopharma’s case. It would have been nothing more than a workshop variation to make the Frey-Wettstein apparatus in a fully closed system by asking one of the existing specialist manufacturers to use standard procedures to pre-assemble the parts in the factory in sterile conditions. Furthermore Frey-Wettstein points in that direction. It emphasises the good storage characteristics of the filtered components and states that one of its objectives is to prolong shelf life (see paragraph 39 above). By 1988 it would not have been permissible to store the Frey-Wettstein RCC for three weeks and then use it for transfusing into patients. The standards imposed on blood banks to avoid the risk of contamination would have required the RCC to be used within 24 hours. But it would be apparent to anyone in the art that suitability for storage could be regained and enhanced by making and using the apparatus in the standard closed condition. |
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46. |
Furthermore it is not legitimate to approach Frey-Wettstein, as Mr. Thorley does, by asking whether anyone in practice would have thought of implementing it at all. The notional skilled addressee comes to the prior art with a practical interest in the design, manufacture and use of blood component separators. He is taken to be interested in removing leukocytes at least from some blood products. He is taken to have read Frey-Wettstein and to be interested in its contents. For reasons set out above, he would have considered the manufacture and operation of a closed version of Frey-Wettstein to be no more than a workshop variation of what the authors describe. |
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47. |
In addition, even if Mr. Thorley’s approach was permissible as a matter of law, I accept Dr Pietersz’ evidence that Frey-Wettstein would have been thought of as very interesting in 1988. Even if the notional addressee in the art is assumed to have settled into thinking of always using filters just before transfusion, this article would have told him that filtering the whole blood first would result in leucocyte depleted components which could then be stored and that at least one blood bank had done this. |
Mr. Thorley drew particular attention to the judge’s conclusion in paragraph 46 that the notional skilled person was “taken to have read Frey-Wettstein [the pleaded prior art] and to be interested in its contents.” He accepted that the law presupposes that the skilled person would read the pleaded prior art. That must be right as the statutory test requires a decision as to whether the invention is obvious “having regard to any matter which forms part of the state of the art”. That could only be decided once the document relied on as being part of the state of the art has been read.
Mr. Thorley submitted that the judge had, when considering the fourth step in Windsurfing, ignored evidence and argument as to the level of interest which the prior art document would actually arouse in the skilled person. Prima facie the modifications which would provide invention to an uninteresting citation should be less than those to an interesting one. Relying upon statements in the Windsurfing case, Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v Mills and Rockley (Electronics) Ltd [1972] RPC 346, Hallen Co. v Brabantia (UK) Ltd [1991] RPC 195, Bonzel v Intervention Ltd (No. 3) [1991] RPC 553 and PLG Research Ltd v Ardon International Ltd [1995] RPC 287 he submitted that the degree of interest that should be attributed to the skilled person was a question of fact to be decided in the light of the contents of the particular document and the evidence. The Act did not impose any presumption as to what that would be.
I will come later to analyse the judge’s reasoning, but must first make it clear that a decision on obviousness does not require a conclusion as to whether or not the skilled person would be slightly, moderately or particularly interested in any document. The court has to adopt the mantle of the skilled person. That mantle will include the prejudices, preferences and attitudes that such persons had at the priority date. Thereafter the court has to decide whether the step or steps from the prior art to the invention were obvious. That decision has to be taken without the invention in mind and through the eyes of the skilled person. Of course any prior art document relied on must be deemed to be read properly and in that sense with interest. To conclude otherwise would deprive the public of their right to make anything which is an obvious modification of a published document. By obvious I mean that which would be obvious to the skilled person. The correct approach was set out by Oliver LJ in the Windsurfing case. He said at page 74 line 20:
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We agree, of course, that one must not assume that the skilled man, casting his experienced eye over Darby [the prior art], would at once be fired with knowledge that here was something which had a great commercial future which he must bend every effort to develop and improve, but he must at least be assumed to appreciate and understand the free-save concept taught by Darby and to consider, in the light of his knowledge and experience, whether it would work and how it will work. |
Later when considering the attack upon the patent based upon the prior use by Peter Chilvers, Oliver LJ said at page 77:
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If Peter Chilvers had adopted, as part of his device, the conventional wishbone boom in place of the more primitive straight split boom which he in fact used, it would, we should have thought, have been quite unarguable that this would not have been an anticipation under sub-paragraph (e), for the notion behind anticipation is, as we understand it, that it would be wrong to enable the patentee to prevent a man from doing what he has lawfully done before the patent was granted. No doubt, the philosophy behind sub-paragraph (f) [obviousness] is different to this extent, that a patent is granted only for an invention and that which is obvious is not inventive, but it also must, we think, take into account the same concept as anticipation, namely that it would be wrong to prevent a man from doing something which is merely an obvious extension of what he has been doing or of what was known in the art before the priority date of the patent granted. This emerges perhaps most clearly from the following passages from the speech of Lord Moulton in Gillette Safety Razor Co. Ltd v Anglo-American Trading Co. Ltd (1913) 30 RPC 465 at 480: “But he” – a prior inventor – “has shown the world how to make a safety razor by clamping a blade in the way which I have described … The knowledge so communicated applies to blades of any section. After the public has been shown how thus to clamp a blade, one cannot make a novel invention by saying that, instead of clamping a thick blade, one will clamp a thin one … If the claims of such a patent were so wide as to include it, the patent would be bad, because it would include something which differed by no patentable difference from that which was already in possession of the public. Such a patent would be bad for want of novelty … from the point of view of the public it is important that this method of viewing their rights should not be overlooked. In practical life it is often the only safeguard to the manufacturers. It is impossible for an ordinary member of the public to keep watch on all the numerous patents which are taken out and to ascertain the validity and scope of their claims. But he is entitled to feel secure if he knows that that which he is doing differs from that which has been done of old only in non-patentable variations, such as the substitution of mechanical equivalents or changes of material shape or size. Mr. Chilvers, of course, and indeed, any of the persons who witnessed or copied his aquatic feats, are members of the public and one asks then on what principle should such persons, who clearly cannot be prevented from doing exactly that which they did before, be prevented from doing that which is no more than an obvious variant of what they did before? |
Mr. Thorley also submitted that the judge had wrongly rejected his submissions that were recorded by the judge as paragraph 46 of his judgment. He submitted that an invention would not be obvious unless there was some motivation to implement the disclosure in the prior art and to take the steps required to arrive at the invention. In certain cases that can be right. Such cases are usually those where the invention lies in the idea of taking a step. However, motivation may not be a requirement. The fact that nobody would dream of making a plate one inch bigger than the standard size does not mean that there would be invention in making one. In Pharmacia Corporation v Merck & Co Inc [2001] EWCA Civ 1610, I cited this passage from the speech of Laddie J in Hoechst v Celanese Corp v BP Chemicals Ltd [1997] FSR 547 at 573:
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Before a step from the prior art can be held to be obvious there must be some reason why the man skilled in the art would wish to take it. If he has a problem and the step would occur to him as a solution to it, then he has a reason. But there is no requirement that it be demonstrated that the step would have been expected to produce significant commercial advantages. The problem might be very small. The courts will assume that he may just want an alternative way of achieving essentially the same result as in the prior art. Thus were workshop modifications, none of which would be expected to produce significant technical or commercial benefits are still obvious. To adopt an example sometimes given by Jacob J., if it is known to make a 5-inch plate, it is obvious to make a 5¼ -inch plate. Technicians and businessmen frequently want to make trivial variations in established or known products. Similarly if the prior art discloses two wooden parts held together by screws it would be obvious to glue them, even if so doing would not be expected to advance the industry. The notional addressee is likely to want to use materials readily at hand to make essentially the same thing as is disclosed in the prior art. That is sufficient motivation and the use of those materials is, accordingly, obvious. When the defendants argue that Hingorani or any of his readers is entitled to use any "natural extension" or "obvious variant" of his concept, they are correct if by that they mean the type of workshop modification or alternative discussed above. But it was not and could not be suggested by any witness that changing the medium from aqueous to organic and changing the resin was a mere workshop variant of what is set out in Hingorani. |
I continued:
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124. |
That statement of the law was, I expect, apt on the facts of that case, but should not be followed generally. A step from the prior art, albeit made without reason, can still be obvious. The judge categorises such a step as workshop modifications and, in so doing, introduces a test not in the statute, namely whether the step from the prior art was a workshop modification. The statutory test is obviousness and any modification which is obvious will not be patentable, whereas one which is not obvious will be. The true test, as made clear in Windsurfing, is to ask whether the invention was obvious. Whether or not there is a reason for taking the step from the prior art may well be an important consideration, but that does not mean that it is an essential requirement of a conclusion of obviousness. |
The judge did not in paragraph 46 of his judgment fall into the error of principle that Mr. Thorley submitted that he had. What he said in that paragraph has to be read in the light of the conclusion he had reached in paragraph 45. The judge concluded that the step from the prior art was a “workshop variation” and therefore was an obvious step. Mr. Thorley had submitted that it was not obvious because the skilled person would not in practice have thought of implementing it at all. If the step from the prior art lacked invention, then it mattered not whether anybody would have thought of implementing it. The public are entitled to make obvious modifications. Whether they would want to do so will depend upon a variety of factors which could include such things as cost and the attitudes of users.
Mr. Thorley submitted that the judge should have asked himself what the skilled person “would” have done having read the prior art. No doubt he “could” have made modifications, but there was no perceived useful purpose in either implementing the prior art or making modifications to it. To support the submission that it was necessary to conclude that the skilled person would make the required modifications before a finding of obviousness was possible, Mr. Thorley referred us to cases in the EPO and the journal “Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO”.
There can be no doubt that an invention can lie in realising that something can be done or in realising that some effect would be produced. The EPO cases are illustrative of that. But provided the structured approach in Windsurfing is adopted there is no need for the Court first to decide whether the invention falls into one of those categories and then to decide which one. The isolation of the inventive concept in the first step and the ascertainment of the difference between that and the prior art in the third step, naturally lead the court to answer the correct question: namely, whether the invention was obvious. Evidence as to what could or could not or what would or would not be done can be relevant, but the correct question is that laid down in the statute.
Frey-Wettstein
This article was the primary piece of prior art relied on. It appeared in the journal Vox Sang of 1974. It reports the work of the Swiss Red Cross. The abstract reads as follows:
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A simple method is described for the preparation of leukocyte-poor red cell concentrates from fresh and stored CPD blood. Warm normal CPD blood is passed through a nylon wool filter. After centrifugation at 1,5000g for 3 min, the plasma, the buffy coat and the top 30 ml of the red cell concentrate are eliminated. The average removal of leukocytes is better than 97%, the relation of remaining lymphocytes and granulocytes being 1:1. Red cell loss ranges around 20%. Advantages and disadvantages are discussed. |
The judge described the disclosure in these terms:
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38. |
The main text of the paper starts by recording the increasing demand for leucocyte depleted blood for patients with febrile transfusion reactions (see paragraph 17 above) and the need for simple and economic methods of getting rid of the HLA covered leucocytes and platelets (see paragraph 19 above). The introductory section ends with the following: With a view to diminishing the leukocyte content of the filtrate and to prolong the shelf life of the leukocyte-poor red cell concentrate, we have attempted to process blood collected into standard CPD plastic bags. |
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39. |
The method, described by the authors as their “routine”, consists of taking either recently collected or stored blood and filtering it through the then-available Leukopak filter material so as to produce leucodepleted whole blood in standard plastic bags. This is then centrifuged so as to produce different layers. The supernatant plasma, the buffy coat and the top 30 ml of the red cell sediment are then decanted into a satellite bag. The result is leucodepleted RCC. The authors assert that the advantages of their system include the fact that it can be carried out with commercially available equipment by any blood bank technician and is fast. They also say: It has the advantage of being performed in an almost closed system with only minimal possibilities of contamination when filter and transfer packs are connected. Preliminary sterility tests showed that leukocyte-poor CPD blood remains sterile even after a 21-day storage period. |
The article concludes with the statement that filtered CPD blood has at least two major advantages compared with filtrated heparinized blood: shelf life of the product is not limited to 40 hours and the removal of lymphocytes is 3 times better.
Mr. Thorley accepted that the paragraphs of the judgment I have quoted were accurate. However he drew attention to the absence in Frey-Wettstein of any step which separated the buffy, the plasma or the top 30 ml of the red cell concentration. Thus only RCC was kept as the product of the centrifugation step and the rest was eliminated. Mr. Thorley submitted that the judge had failed to record that that step was not disclosed and that had led him into error when he came to the third Windsurfing step in paragraph 40 of the judgment:
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40. |
As described, the equipment, when assembled, would have the layout illustrated in Figure 4 above. The difference between that (which is one of the embodiments falling within the claims) and the Frey-Wettstein arrangement is that the former is a closed system – that is to say it is made in a factory with all the bags and connecting tubes pre-assembled in sterile conditions, or made in situ with SCD apparatus – whereas the Frey-Wettstein paper describes a piece of apparatus which is put together on an as-required basis using the equipment then available. In practice this means that it involved the assembly of discrete pieces of equipment using spikes to connect them together, thereby creating an increased risk of contamination. It should be remembered that SCD equipment was not available in 1974. It is because the equipment was assembled in this way that the authors refer to it as being “almost closed”. |
The judge was correct in concluding the Frey-Wettstein disclosed an open system, whereas claim 1 was limited to a closed system. Mr. Thorley is also right that the only useful blood component that is actually isolated is RCC. But that is irrelevant. Claim 1 does not require that the layers produced by the centrifugation step (step (g)) be separated. I also reject the submission that claim 1 contains a strategy that was not disclosed in Frey-Wettstein. Claim 1 claims a method having features (a) to (g), not a strategy. The only method step which is claimed in claim 1, but not disclosed in Frey-Wettstein is the adoption of a closed system.
Mr. Thorley submitted that the judge, when deciding whether the invention was obvious, had failed to take into account the “mind-set” of the skilled person. He submitted that by 1988 the skilled person had become used to using filters, but in general they were not used to filter whole blood. There was no perception by skilled persons that they could or should separate leukocytes from whole blood except in limited circumstances at the bedside. Frey-Wettstein would be seen as an historical curiosity which used CPD instead of heparin in an open system.
Mr. Thorley went on to submit that taking that “mind-set” into account, the judge was wrong to conclude that the difference between Frey-Wettstein and the invention was obvious. The invention produced at least two useful products using a closed system to provide good shelf life. To take the 1974 Frey-Wettstein disclosure and convert it into a system equivalent to that of the invention involved impermissible hindsight reasoning. He drew to our attention the evidence of the witnesses and submitted that the judge’s observations on their evidence could not be supported.
I reject those submissions. Frey-Wettstein discloses filtration of whole blood. By 1988 the need for a closed system to enable storage was appreciated and it was obvious, when implementing Frey-Wettstein, to use a closed system. There was no “mind-set” against filtering whole blood nor against using a closed system. Further, separation of layers after centrifugation was standard. The judge was correct when he said:
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41. |
Macopharma argues that it was obvious in June 1988 that equipment suitable for use in the Frey-Wettstein system could be made in a closed condition. Frey-Wettstein teaches that the blood products produced by its methodology are so nearly closed that they have enhanced storage characteristics. It would be obvious that those characteristics could be further enhanced in 1988 by making the apparatus in a truly closed condition and the obvious way to achieve that would be to ask a manufacturer to pre-assemble the apparatus in sterile conditions. It is not suggested that there would have been any difficulty in 1988 in making such a request or having it fulfilled. Furthermore, even without Frey-Wettstein’s encouragement in that direction, by 1988 a skilled worker in the art would have appreciated the advantages in making the equipment in a closed, as opposed to an almost closed, condition. Unless the equipment is closed, the RCC produced would have to be used within 24 hours, leading to increased wastage. Furthermore Dr. Pietersz says that in 1988 it would have been obvious and desirable not to jettison the mixture of red cells, buffy coat and plasma which are decanted from above the RCC. She says that that would have been wasteful. That material would have been subjected to a further centrifugation so as to produce cell-free plasma. The result would have been to produce a closed system which is indistinguishable from the layout depicted in Figure 5 above. |
The evidence supported that finding.
Mr. Thorley criticised the judge for not referring to and giving weight to the secondary evidence of what had actually been proposed around 1988. That criticism was ill-founded. There was no evidence that suggested that the people who made the proposals relied on by Mr. Thorley had seen or heard of Frey-Wettstein. Thus the evidence was irrelevant when deciding the fourth Windsurfing question. The evidence was also irrelevant to the second step as it was not suggested that the proposals formed part of the common general knowledge. In any case, there was no evidence that the proposals were representative of the thinking at the time.
In my view the judge came to the right conclusion for the right reasons.
Asahi 286
This patent was published about a month before the priority date of the patent. As the judge recorded it relates to a filter. The specification states:
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An object of the present invention is to provide a filter medium useful for a filter for selectively removing leucocytes, which is capable of efficiently removing leucocytes while holding down the loss of platelets to a minimum and which is useful in a platelet transfusion and an extracorporeal circulation leucocyte removal therapy. |
The filter described has the advantage that it removes 90% of leukocytes and allows just over 90% of platelets to pass. This is to be contrasted with prior art filters which could remove substantially more of the leukocytes, but would at the same time remove a substantial proportion of the platelets.
The importance of this patent to these proceedings can be appreciated from these passages of the specification:
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The present invention relates to a fibrous filter medium for selectively removing leucocytes. More particularly, the present invention is concerned with a filter medium for selectively removing leucocytes, which is capable of efficiently removing leucocytes, with little loss of platelets from a cell-containing suspension containing both platelets and leucocytes, represented by blood. … In the field of blood transfusion, platelet transfusion for improving the bleeding condition of a patient fills an important position. Platelet transfusion includes fresh whole blood transfusion, fresh concentrated red cells transfusion, platelet rich plasma transfusion and platelet concentrate transfusion, and in each type of such transfusions, the blood product usually contains a considerable amount of leucocytes. If a patient repeatedly receives transfusion of blood containing leucocytes, anti-leucocyte antibodies are likely to be produced in the patient. |
Example 8 is also relevant in that two litres of bovine whole blood are filtered. It demonstrates the usefulness of using the filter of patent 286 when filtering whole blood.
In my view the judge was correct to conclude that 286 disclosed that the filter of that invention was useful for producing leukocyte depleted blood by filtering amongst other products whole blood. Thus the differences between that disclosure and the invention of claim 1 is the use of a closed system and centrifugation which is step (g) of the patent. The judge held that the differences were obvious. He said:
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52. |
These passages indicate that the filters of the invention can be applied either to whole blood or to one of its separated components. This is confirmed by the rest of the specification. In particular, example 8 describes how two litres of bovine whole blood was passed through the filter. Clearly, this is for the purpose of demonstrating how the novel devices can be used for filtering whole blood. The result of use of this type of filter is therefore to produce blood which has leucocytes removed but all the other, useful, ingredients largely left intact. Dr. Pietersz’ evidence was that this was a very interesting disclosure. She said that if she had seen it in June 1988 she would have thought of employing it in a closed system with collection bag containing anticoagulant, filter, and outlet conduit leading to a satellite bag system all connected by sealable cuttable tubing. She said that one would naturally arrive at something falling within the scope of claim 1. This really was not challenged in cross examination. In fact the only relevant piece of the transcript appears to be as follows:
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53. |
For reasons already given, the fact that cost may drive one away from adopting a technically obvious course does not stop it being obvious. In my view Dr. Pietersz was right in saying that ‘286 would have led you to think of using a closed system falling with the scope of claim 1 (and the other claims in issue). Once a highly selective filter had been described, it was technically obvious to use it to filter whole blood. Indeed this was one of the suggestions made in ‘286. The alternative would be to use separate filters to filter each component of the blood once it had been separated from the others. Thus the choice was between use of a single filters or multiple filters. There was nothing inventive in choosing the former just as there was nothing inventive in proposing that the filter should be used in a closed system. The claims in suit are obvious over ‘286 as well. I should only add a reference to Dr. Pamphilon’s cross-examination in relation to this document. He accepted that the disclosure of ‘286 taken as a whole contained a proposal to filter whole blood through a familiar type of filter in order to remove just leukocytes. He accepted that it would have struck him as something novel because it removes only the least desired of the four major components of whole blood. He also accepted that if you filtered whole blood, you would then centrifuge it. However he refused to accept that it would have led one to thinking of making human blood components by filtering whole blood at the priority date or that it would have been used in a closed system. I did not find Dr. Pamphilon’s evidence in relation to this issue convincing. It is somewhat inconsistent with the statement in his report that before the priority date there was “enthusiasm for developing protocols for white cell depletion of blood and blood components for transfusion” (emphasis added, see paragraph 17 above). Although he appeared to retreat from this evidence under cross-examination, I think his report was accurate in this respect. This is one of those areas in which I prefer and accept the evidence of Dr. Pietersz. |
Mr. Thorley submitted that the judge had not faced up to the gulf between the teaching of 286 and claim 1. The idea or strategy of claim 1 was the production of useful blood components by filtering whole blood. 286 was concerned with a filter to produce leukocyte-depleted blood with passage of platelets. Further the judge had wrongly failed to place reliance upon Dr Pamphilon’s evidence and had read too much into the evidence of Dr Pietersz.
Having read the relevant parts of Dr Pamphilon’s evidence, I believe that the judge was entitled to come to the conclusion that Dr Pamphilon’s evidence was not convincing. There was evidence upon which the judge could decide as he did and upon that evidence he was entitled to come to the conclusion he did.
CONCLUSION
The judge was right to conclude that the relevant claims of the patent were invalid. I would dismiss the appeal.
Lord Justice Tuckey
I agree.
Lord Justice Jonathan Parker
I also agree.
Cases
Biogen Inc. v Medeva Plc [1997] RPC 1; Windsurfing International Inc v Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] RPC 59; Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v Mills & Rockley (Electronics) Ltd [1972] RPC 346; Hallen Co. v Brabantia (UK) Ltd [1991] RPC 195; Bonzel v Intervention Ltd (No. 3) [1991] RPC 553; PLG Research Ltd v Ardon International Ltd [1995] RPC 287; Pharmacia Corporation v Merck & Co Inc [2001] EWCA Civ 1610; Hoechst v Celanese Corp v BP Chemicals Ltd [1997] FSR 547
Authors and other references
Vox Sang of 1974
Representations
Simon Thorley QC and Guy Burkill for the Appellant/Claimant (instructed by CMS Cameron McKenna)
Christopher Floyd QC and Douglas Campbell for the Respondents/Defendants (instructed by Wragge & Co)
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